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Congress' Power of the Purse
Kate Stitht
In view of the significance of Congress' power of the purse, it is surprising
that there has been so little scholarly exploration of its contours. In this Arti-
cle, Professor Stith draws upon constitutional structure, history, and practice
to develop a general theory of Congress' appropriations power. She concludes
that the appropriations clause of the Constitution imposes an obligation upon
Congress as well as a limitation upon the executive branch: The Executive
may not raise or spend funds not appropriated by explicit legislative action,
and Congress has a constitutional duty to limit the amount and duration of
each grant of spending authority. Professor Stith examines forms of spending
authority that are constitutionally troubling, especially gift authority, through
which Congress permits federal agencies to receive and spend private contri-
butions without further legislative review. Other types of "backdoor" spending
authority, including statutory entitlements and revolving funds, may also be
inconsistent with Congress' duty to exercise control over the size and duration
of appropriations. Finally, Professor Stith proposes that nonjudicial institu-
tions such as the General Accounting Office play a larger role in enforcing
and vindicating Congress' power of the purse.
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The covert program of support for the Contras evaded the Consti-
tution's most significant check on Executive power: the President
can spend funds on a program only if he can convince Congress to
appropriate the money.'
Among the duties-and among the rights, too-of this House,
there is perhaps none so important as the control which it constitu-
tionally possesses over the public purse.'
The Constitution places the power of the purse in Congress: "No
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appro-
priations made by Law . . ... , This empowerment of the legislature is
at the foundation of our constitutional order. Yet there has been virtually
no sustained legal scholarship that addresses the constitutional function
and significance of Congress' power of the purse, explains how Congress'
exclusive power of appropriation relates to other constitutional powers of
Congress and the President, or considers the proper arenas in which the
appropriations requirement might be construed and enforced." Nor has it
previously been proposed that Congress itself might violate the appropria-
1. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN
OPPOSITION & HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH
IRAN, REPORT, S. REP. No. 100-216, H.R. REP. No. 100-433, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1987)
[hereinafter IRAN-CONTRA REPORT].
2. 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 1330 (1809) (remarks of Rep. J. Randolph).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, ci. 7.
4. A thoughtful consideration of some of these issues is L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING
POWER (1975); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 257 (2d ed. 1988) (noting
dearth of scholarship concerning constitutional constraints on executive spending power). The most
thorough account of the early struggles between Congress and the Executive over control of the fisc is
L. WILMERDING, THE SPENDING POWER (1943).
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tions clause by failing to exercise effective control over federal
expenditures. 5
The present inquiry may be summarized as follows. The Constitution
presupposes a distinction between the public sphere and the private
sphere and permits expansion of the public sphere only with legislative
approval. The appropriations requirement both reflects and implements
these fundamental constitutional choices. In specifying the activities on
which public funds may be spent, the legislature defines the contours of
the federal government.
From this understanding of the structural function of appropriations,
we may derive two governing principles: first, a Principle of the Public
Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part
of the government are public funds, and second, a Principle of Appropria-
tions Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legis-
lative authorization. The two principles are complementary: The Public
Fisc principle defines all federal receipts, while the Appropriations Con-
trol principle defines all lawful federal expenditures.
These two principles impose powerful limitations on the executive
branch. Agencies and officials of the federal government may not spend
monies from any source, private or public, without legislative permission
to do so. Even where unauthorized spending by the Executive would im-
pose no additional obligation on the Treasury-because it is made with
private or other non-governmental funds-the Constitution prohibits such
spending if it is not authorized by Congress. All federal receipts must be
"deposited," at least figuratively, into the Treasury, and all spending in
the name of the United States must be pursuant to legislative
appropriation.
The Principles of the Public Fisc and of Appropriations Control also
impose an obligation on Congress itself. Congress has not only the power
but also the duty to exercise legislative control over federal expenditures.
If Congress permits the Executive access to the public fisc without effec-
tive appropriations control, then the Executive alone defines the scope and
character of the public sphere, especially in areas that inherently require
significant executive discretion. Congress abdicates, rather than exercises,
its power of the purse if it creates permanent or other open-ended spend-
ing authority that effectively escapes periodic legislative review and limita-
tion. Accordingly, I propose that not every legislative grant of spending
5. Students of the Constitution have generally assumed that Congress has exclusive authority to
construe and implement the appropriations clause and thus have not considered the possibility that
Congress itself may violate the clause. See, e.g., E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT
MEANS TODAY 133-34 (14th ed. 1978); 1 W. WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 105 (2d ed. 1929). But see CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES 95 (R. Goldwin, W.
Schambra & A. Kaufman eds. 1987) (suggestion by author that certain aspects of legislative budget
practice are "not in keeping with at least the spirit of the appropriations clause").
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authority necessarily qualifies as an "Appropriation[ ] made by Law"
under the Constitution.
Under present practice, Congress creates many forms of spending au-
thority outside of the legislative appropriations process, many of which are
open-ended as to amount or time.6 Not all of this spending is constitution-
ally suspect, for Congress may effectively limit spending authority through
substantive legislation and periodic review, even when the form of the au-
thority is open-ended. In determining whether a grant of spending author-
ity is a constitutional appropriation, it does not matter whether Congress
uses the word "appropriate." What matters is whether Congress in fact
determines how much funding for a government activity is "appropriate."
Section I develops a general theory of Congress' appropriations power
and proposes that the Principles of the Public Fisc and of Appropriations
Control are implicit in our constitutional order. Section II examines how
Congress has construed and implemented the appropriations requirement
in two framework statutes first enacted in the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries: the Miscellaneous Receipts statute7 and the Anti-
Deficiency Act.' Section III argues that, in certain circumstances, legisla-
tion granting permanent or indefinite spending authority outside of legis-
lative appropriations control is inconsistent with the basic constitutional
obligations of Congress. Section IV suggests why the judicial branch may
not be the proper arena for enforcement of the appropriations clause, es-
pecially against Congress, and proposes that Congress clarify and
strengthen the role of institutions such as the General Accounting Office
in implementing Congress' power of the purse.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF APPROPRIATIONS
A. The Constitutional Prerequisites for Federal Government Activity
The Constitution postulates a limited federal government that is, for the
most part, legislatively authorized. This postulate embodies a foundational
value choice that permeates our constitutional structure.9 In the absence of
legislation, there would be few federal institutions or activities. 1°
Moreover, the Constitution's enumeration of legislative powers in sec-
tion 8 of article I and elsewhere" imposes both substantive and proce-
6. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
7. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (1982).
8. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1351 (1982).
9. See generally Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489,
490-504 (1954). Cf S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION 290, 302, 353-54 (1960) (limited political
realm is fundamental premise of modern Western thought).
10. The Constitution creates few government institutions directly and imposes (or presumes the
necessity of) few governmental obligations requiring expenditure, at least outside the area of foreign
affairs. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
11. Although article I, section 8 is the primary source of Congress' legislative power, other provi-
sions contain additional grants of power. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (power to regulate
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dural limitations upon enlargement of the federal sphere. Not only must
Congress' acts be affirmatively permitted by the Constitution (the substan-
tive limitation), but, further, they must be in the form of legislation (the
procedural limitation).12 In combination with article II, the enumerated
legislative powers define the potential governing authority of the operating
branch of the federal government-the executive branch.3 Except where
the Constitution grants powers and duties directly to the President, 4 exec-
utive governing authority 5 must be created by legislation. The multiple
constitutional prerequisites for government activity are checks upon the
exercise of government power, reflecting the foundational decision that the
exercise of such power should be deliberate and limited. 6
The concept of a "limited" federal government does not mean that the
size of the federal government must be small or that Congress and the
Executive must limit their exercise of constitutional power; it means, more
fundamentally, that the federal government is a defined set of activities
constituting a subset of all activities within the polity.'
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); id. art. IV, § 1 (power to implement full faith and credit
clause); id. art. IV, § 3 (power to admit new states); id. art. V (role in ratification of constitutional
amendments); see also id. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI (power to imple-
ment rights guaranteed).
12. Legislation requires "bicameralism" and "presentment." See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
945-51 (1983).
13. In referring to the executive branch as the "operating" branch, I mean simply that it is the
branch that is active, performing operations in the name of the government. The legislative branch
and article III courts also exercise government power, of course, but Congress and the courts necessa-
rily delegate to others the power to implement their exercises of power. Although all three branches
are part of the United States government, only the executive branch has the "sword" necessary for
enforcement of federal law. See also infra note 197 ("executive branch" includes federal agencies that
are not under presidential control).
14. See, e.g., infra note 32. In contrast to the forthright and wide-ranging enumeration of legisla-
tive powers in article I, the enumeration of presidential powers in article II is remarkably vague and
emphasizes the formal, almost ceremonial, aspects of presidential leadership.
15. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("executive Power"); id. art. II, § 3 (faithful execution
clause). The faithful execution clause should not be understood as a separate grant of power to the
President. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
16. Article III review also provides a check on government action, though it is not a prerequisite
to action. The concomitant commands of the Constitution that government activity be undertaken by
an elected President upon authorization of a representative Congress, but that government action be
reviewable by an appointed judiciary, are fully consistent under either of two approaches. First, from
a purely behavioral perspective, the judiciary may be viewed as simply another check upon the exer-
cise of power by the operating branch of the government. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 449, 453, 462, 552 (1969). Alternatively, from the perspective of
democratic theory, if there are erroneous or invalid assertions of popular will, see K. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); W. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CON-
FRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE
(1982); Coleman & Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, 97 ETHICS 7, 19-20 (1986), the judici-
ary may be available to correct these mistakes.
17. The conception of federal activity in the structure of the original Constitution is related to,
though not necessarily the same as, the conception of "state action" in the first eight and the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (discussed
infra note 28 and accompanying text); id. amends. XIX, XXIV, XXVI. Both the idea of a limited
federal government and the "state action" requirement reflect constitutional circumscription of govern-
mene and imply that not every social condition in the polity is, for constitutional purposes, a govern-
mental policy. However, the two conceptions are not precisely equivalent, for they perform different
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Implicit in the decision to establish a "limited" federal government, ca-
pable of growing only by incremental, deliberate, and coordinated deci-
sions of the political branches, is a view of government action somewhat at
odds with the contemporary inclination to treat failure to act as a species
of action. 8 The Constitution's grant of power to Congress to alter the
social and economic relations of the polity by legislation does not by itself
accomplish any such alteration. It is not enough that Congress and the
President are vested with the power to act; in order to alter or reshape the
polity, they must exercise this power.1 9
An additional obstacle to enlargement of the national government is
that federal action usually costs money, and financing of any such action
must be constitutionally authorized. The Constitution does not require
that all forms of national governance involve activity by the executive
branch; Congress may exercise its constitutional powers in ways other
than creating executive authority to act in the name of the United States.2"
However, all activity of the executive branch-all actions undertaken by
and in the name of the United States government-must be authorized
and paid for pursuant to the Constitution.
B. The Place of Congress' Power To Appropriate in the Structure of the
Constitution
While section 8 of article I enumerates the powers of the legislative
branch, the appropriations clause in section 9 is not a grant of power.
Rather, the appropriations clause affirmatively obligates Congress to exer-
cise a power already in its possession.
Congress' power to appropriate originates in article I, section 8. The
concept of "necessary and proper" legislation to carry out "all . . .Pow-
ers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States"
includes the power to spend public funds on authorized federal activities.2"
constitutional functions. In particular, the "state action" requirement under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and elsewhere defines the scope of individual liberties; the concept of federal activity in the
original Constitution is a corollary of the presumed primacy of non-federal activity.
18. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 501-04 (1987).
19. That our constitutional structure postulates private and state activity as primary, and federal
activity as secondary, does not deny that Congress and other political institutions may be held politi-
cally accountable for their failure to exercise power, as well as for their exercise of power. Cf CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1648 (1987) and cases cited therein (discussing
"dormant" commerce power of Congress under U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). Nor does the distinc-
tion deny that there may be some instances in which the structural provisions of the Constitution
require Congress or the federal government to act. See, e.g., infra note 31 (census).
20. Congress has constitutional power to govern by means that involve no cost to the federal
government and no federal government action. For instance, federal legislation may require payment
of taxes to state institutions, or require state institutions to regulate various forms of private activity
(e.g., pollution).
21. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419-21 (1819) (necessary and proper
clause grants Congress discretion to choose any appropriate means of exercising its powers); see also
Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1971) ("[T]he affirmative
1348 [Vol. 97: 1343
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Article I, section 8 also grants Congress the obverse power: the power to
prevent the spending of any public funds except as authorized by Con-
gress. That is, even if there were no appropriations clause in the Constitu-
tion, Congress would have the power to enact a statutory "appropriations
clause," worded exactly the same as the clause in article I, section 9, mak-
ing Congress' appropriations power exclusive. If Congress could not pro-
hibit the Executive from withdrawing funds from the Treasury, then the
constitutional grants of power to the legislature to raise taxes22 and to
borrow money"3 would be for naught because the Executive could effec-
tively compel such legislation by spending at will. The "legislative Pow-
ers" referred to in section 8 of article I would then be shared by the Presi-
dent in his executive as well as in his legislative capacity.
Since legislative appropriations power is rooted in article I, section 8,
we may infer that a primary significance of the appropriations clause in
section 9 lies in what it takes away from Congress: the option not to re-
quire legislative appropriations prior to expenditure. If the Constitution
thus strictly forbids "executive appropriation" of public funds,24 the exer-
cise by Congress of its power of the purse is a structural imperative.2 5
The placement of the appropriations requirement in section 9 of article
I, rather than in section 8, supports the understanding that it is not a
grant of affirmative power,26 or an expansion of other congressional pow-
ers, 27 but is, rather, a condition or limitation on the exercise of legislative
power of Congress-indeed, the power to which the phrase 'appropriation made by law' has refer-
ence-is the enumeration of powers in section 8, of course, of article I . . ... ") (statement of Prof.
Alexander Bickel); 1 W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 5, at 98; cf. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in
Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the
Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause: 40 LAW & CONTEMp. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102,
116-18 (necessary and proper clause includes legislative power to limit "ancillary" constitutional
powers vested in President).
22. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
23. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
24. Inasmuch as "executive appropriation" would render Congress' other fiscal powers meaning-
less, it might be argued that even in the absence of the appropriations clause, Congress could not
permit "executive appropriations." Under this view, the appropriations clause is a form of "clear
statement" confirming the implicit constitutional command that only Congress (with the President in
his legislative capacity) may appropriate federal funds. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at
420-21 (even without necessary and proper clause, Congress could enact all laws necessary and
proper; the clause is simply a clear statement of this power).
25. Structural analysis may yield other constitutional imperatives as well. See generally C.
BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). See also Gewirtz, The
Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1976, at 46, 48 (system of constitutional checks and balances depends on Congress'
role as main policy-maker); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954)
(structure of Constitution vests Congress, not Supreme Court, with ultimate authority for federal
intervention in state government).
26. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 419-20 (placement of necessary and proper clause at
end of article I, section 8 confirms that it is grant of power to Congress, not limitation on that power).
27. In this respect, the appropriations clause is structurally different from the necessary and
proper clause, which by "[i]ts terms purport[s] to enlarge . . . the powers vested in the government."
Id. at 420. Congress' power to appropriate is an aspect of its authority to enact necessary and proper
legislation to effectuate various constitutional powers; the appropriations requirement, on the other
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power.28 The Constitution's appropriations requirement is not only a con-
dition precedent to executive branch action, but also a condition subse-
quent to general legislative directives. Because of the appropriations re-
quirement, it is not enough for Congress to direct federal agencies to
produce a better world; nor is it enough for Congress to list the authorized
activities in which the executive branch of the government may engage.
For the executive branch to act to achieve the ends of government identi-
fied by Congress, Congress must affirmatively authorize the funds to do
the job.
Although the Constitution's appropriations requirement is not a typical
grant of authority to the legislative branch, we may nonetheless usefully
conceive of it as a "power." The requirement of legislative control over
federal funds is a source of congressional authority over the operating arm
of the federal government. This authority, which Congress must exercise
over federal entities and activities, is analogous to the conditional spending
power that Congress may exercise over states and other nonfederal entities
pursuant to the Constitution's general welfare clause."' In each case, the
ability to place conditions on the use of money authorized to be spent is a
source of power over the recipient.
Limits on Congress' appropriations power derive from limitations on,
and obligations of, the government expressed elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion. Thus, the First Amendment imposes a limitation upon the exercise
of all government powers,"0 including Congress' appropriations power.
Significantly, Congress is obliged to provide public funds for constitution-
hand, is a limitation on all federal power.
28. Other limitations on congressional power in article I, section 9 are the proscriptions against
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see also Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III: Separating the. Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REv.
205, 225-29 (1985) (discussing limitations fn section 9 of article 1). Even when recognizing that the
rest of article I, section 9 limits legislative power, commentators have summarily asserted that the
appropriations clause limits only executive power. See, e.g., 1 W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 5, at
104-06; E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 133-37.
I do not place primary significance on the placement of the appropriations requirement in section 9;
this placement is but one aspect of the structural argument presented here. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 9-25 (structural premises of Constitution); supra text accompanying notes 21-29 (relation-
ship between power to appropriate and other legislative powers); infra text accompanying notes
30-38 (relationship between Congress' power to appropriate and President's constitutional powers);
infra text accompanying notes 63-65 (relationship between statement and accounts clause and appro-
priations clause). Placement of the appropriations requirement in section 9 is consistent, however,
with the dual intent of the framers both to limit the power of the executive branch and to restrain the
federal government as a whole. Cf G. WooD, supra note 16, at 157 (discussing framers' mistrust of
executive); id. at 376 (mistrust of government).
29. The term "spending power" as used in Supreme Court jurisprudence refers to legislative
power to spend for the general welfare and common defense enumerated in article I, section 8. See,
e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1981), modified on other
grounds, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). The appropriations requirement pertains to any expenditure of federal
funds, whether the expenditure is made pursuant to the "spending power" or any other constitutional
power. Commentators sometimes confuse the two terms, using the term "spending power" to mean
"appropriations power," and vice-versa. See, e.g., 1 W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 5, at 98-99,
104-05.
30. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1976) (per curiam).
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ally mandated activities-both obligations imposed upon the government
generally 1 and independent constitutional activities of the President. For
instance, in the area of foreign affairs, Congress itself would violate the
Constitution if it refused to appropriate funds for the President to receive
foreign ambassadors or to make treaties. 2 Although Congress holds the
purse-strings, it may not exercise this power in a manner inconsistent
with the direct commands of the Constitution."
At the same time, the appropriations clause enjoins the President to
spend funds in the name of the United States only as appropriated by
Congress. Even where the President believes that Congress has trans-
gressed the Constitution by failing to provide funds for a particular activ-
ity, the President has no constitutional authority to draw funds from the
Treasury to finance the activity.&4 Spending in the absence of appropria-
tions is ultra vires. Of course, where an emergency exists, the President
might decide that principles more fundamental than the Constitution's ap-
propriations requirement justify spending. 5 The constitutional processes
31. Some constitutional obligations directly compel the expenditure of money, such as the require-
ment of a periodic census. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Other constitutional provisions may be
construed to require expenditure of public funds in particular situations. The equal protection clause,
for instance, may require the government to expand the scope of a statutory entitlement, see, e.g.,
Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), at least until and
unless Congress amends the entitlement to avoid the equal protection violation. See also Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (state ordered to pay cost of education improvement program).
32. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (presidential power to receive ambassadors); id. art. II, § 2, cI. 2
(presidential power to make treaties).
Another example is the President's pardon power, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Congress' power over
appropriations does not allow Congress to deny or to direct the pardon power. Compare United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-48 (1871) (Congress may not interfere with pardon power)
with Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62 (1886) (pardon authority does not alter power of Congress
subsequently to refuse appropriations to pay debts to persons pardoned).
33. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1946) (Congress cannot enact bills of
attainder through appropriations legislation); see also 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 507 (1960); 41 Op. Att'y
Gen. 230 (1955); 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 731 (1980) (all stating that Constitution prohibits Con-
gress from exercising appropriations power. in a manner that violates other constitutional require-
ments); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam) (even where Congress has plenary
legislative authority, it cannot exercise that authority so as to offend some other constitutional
restriction).
34. If a court determines that Congress' failure to provide funds is unconstitutional, one would
expect Congress to abide by this judicial decision and appropriate funds accordingly. If Congress fails
to do so, however, a court has no more constitutional authority than does the President to mandate
withdrawal from the Treasury. See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 290-91 (1850); Na-
tional Ass'n of Regional Councils v. Costle, 564 F.2d 583, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1977). On the other hand,
federal courts have constitutional authority to direct state fiscal operations in order to effectuate fed-
eral constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988) (af-
firming district court order enjoining local authorities to issue bonds and increase property tax levies
to pay for desegregation remedies); Frug, TheJudicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715
(1978) (discussing power of federal courts to require expenditures by states); see also id. at 750
(suggesting that judicial power stops short of enjoining Congress to appropriate).
35. For instance, at the outbreak of the Civil War, President Lincoln authorized the expenditure
of two million dollars in public funds in advance of appropriations. "For this action there was no
warrant whatever in law, but by taking it and other actions like it Lincoln conceived himself to have
saved the government from overthrow." L. WILMERDING, supra note 4, at 14. As Wilmerding
explains:
There are certain circumstances which constitute a law of necessity and self-preservation and
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for resolving such situations, as well as cases where Congress fails to ap-
propriate money for an inherent executive activity, are political."
Although Congress may not completely frustrate the exercise of the
President's constitutional duties, this is but a marginal circumscription of
Congress' power over the purse and its other legislative powers. The Pres-
ident's duty to execute"7 subconstitutional law (i.e., treaties and statutes)
is subject to plenary legislative regulation. Congress retains significant
constitutional power to constrain the President through appropriations
limitations as long as these constraints do not prevent the Executive from
fulfilling indispensable constitutional duties. 8
C. The Constitutional Function of "Appropriations"
Generally, an appropriation is thought of as the specification of an
amount of money for a federal agency or activity, while the range of ac-
tions on which the money may be spent is defined in other legislation 39 (or
in conditions or "riders"' in appropriations bills themselves). This is an
accurate description of legislative practice, but it obscures the importance
of the power of the purse. The "Appropriations" required by the Consti-
tution are not only legislative specifications of money amounts, but also
legislative specifications of the powers, activities, and purposes-what we
may call, simply, "objects"-for which appropriated funds may be used.
Whether the constitutional demand for legislative authorization of public
expenditure stems primarily from concerns with corruption or negligence
in public expenditure, or from a political fear or distrust of an Executive
which render the salus populi supreme over the written law. The officer who is called to act
upon this superior ground does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of
the Constitution, but his station makes it his duty to incur that risk.
Id. at 12.
36. Political processes contemplated by the Constitution include elections and impeachment pro-
ceedings. See also 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 507, 526 (1960) ("Conceivably, under [the appropriations clause]
Congress could refuse to appropriate any funds at all to implement legislation, however essential the
appropriation might be for the country's welfare. The remedy in such a case would be political.").
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks
on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U.L. REV. 59, 90 (1983) (probable purpose of faithful execution
clause was not to expand presidential power but "to rule out any power for him to . . . suspend...
the execution of the laws").
38. See Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 119 (Congress has sole power under necessary and proper
clause "to determine and to make provision for incidental (but not indispensable) powers . . . in the
executive [branch]"); C. BLACK, supra note 25, at 79-90 (discussing congressional power to limit
executive power by enacting legislation).
39. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-11 to 2-13, 2-22 to 2-25, 2-38 to 2-44 (1982) [hereinafter GAO PRINCI-
PLEs]. Often the other legislation is organic or enabling legislation that creates a federal agency or a
new federal activity. Id. at 2-11. See, e.g., infra note 43 (Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act of 1973); infra note 44 (Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973). Such organic legislation is
sometimes referred to by the somewhat misleading label "appropriation authorization." See infra note
135.
40. The term "rider" usually refers to nongermane conditions in appropriations legislation, see B.
GROSS, THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE 221 (1953), and thus has a negative connotation, see, e.g.,
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410, 415 (1937).
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not subject to this check by Congress, the appropriations requirement en-
sures that the legislature in deciding the size and content of the federal
budget decides also the size and content of the federal government."1
All appropriations thus may be conceived of as lump-sum grants with
"strings" attached. These strings, or conditions of expenditure, constitute
legislative prescriptions that bind the operating arm of government. Occa-
sionally, conditions may be stated in an appropriations statute itself. For
instance, an appropriations act may provide that "[n]o part of any appro-
priation contained in this Act shall be used . . . for publicity or propa-
ganda purposes . ". . . " Alternatively, the appropriations act may re-
quire that the recipient federal agency allocate the amount appropriated
among certain activities or in accordance with certain conditions. 43 Often,
the appropriations act explicitly incorporates other legislation, notably
substantive legislation creating particular federal agencies or programs or
granting particular agency powers." Moreover, all appropriations legisla-
tion effectively incorporates the prescriptions of statutes of general
applicability.45
The concept of "appropriations" as developed through the centuries in
England"" and as adopted by the colonies47 encompassed dual limitations
on both amount and object. Legislative supremacy over the public fisc im-
plies "the right to specify how appropriated moneys shall be spent,"' 48
41. The effective reach of federal governance depends on the range of activities funded by a par-
ticular appropriation. If authorized to do so, for instance, the Executive may by regulation impose
significant out-of-pocket costs on private entities or state governments. But any executive activity itself
costs money-including promulgation of regulations, imposition of fees, or oversight of state enforce-
ment. If Congress does not authorize promulgation of regulations, a federal agency may not use them
to expand the reach of its regulatory power.
42. Department of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act, fiscal year
1979, Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 407, 92 Stat. 1589 (1978).
43. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 1, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-51, § 101(a)(1), (3), 95 Stat. 958, 958-59
(1981) (expired Nov. 20, 1981), incorporating H.R. REP. No. 251, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1981)
(continuing appropriation for Department of Labor "for expenses necessary to carry into effect the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 . . . . Provided, That no funds from any
other appropriation shall be used to provide meal services at or for Job Corps centers.").
44. For an example, see the fiscal year 1977 appropriation for ACTION, Departments of Labor
and Health, Education and Welfare Appropriations Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418,
1434 (1976) ("For expenses necessary for ACTION to carry out the provisions of the Domestic
Volunteer Service Act of 1973, as amended, $108,200,000.").
45. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174-88 (1978) (appropriation of funds for projects is
subject to all generally applicable legislation, including Endangered Species Act).
46. See T. TASSWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 192, 217 (10th ed.
1946) (Parliamentary attempts to restrain "King's prerogative" to spend at will).
47. L. LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 269-305 (1930); V. BROWNE, THE CON-
TROL OF THE PUBLIC BUDGET 16 (1949).
48. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 113 (1974) (citing 2 H. HALLAM, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 357 (1884)). That appropriations may be spent only on the objects for which
they are appropriated is a fundamental underpinning of our democratic order. There were early
impeachments of officials in England for misapplication of appropriated funds. See STAFF OF THE
IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTrru-
TIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 5, 7 (Comm. Print 1974); R. BERGER, IM-
PEACHMENT 70-71 (1973) (citing 1 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 89 (1816) (impeachment of King's
Chancellor, 1386); 8 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 127 (1816) (impeachment of Treasurer of Navy,
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which takes on added significance in a separation-of-powers regime. Our
Constitution adopts this conception of appropriations. As Alexander
Hamilton explained, "no money can be expended, but for an object, to an
extent, and out of a fund, which the laws have prescribed.""9 The "ex-
tent" or amount of funding modifies and shapes the "object" funded.50
One of the earliest statutes enacted by Congress to implement the appro-
priations clause 1 explicitly codifies this concept of object limitations on
appropriations. The present codification of that legislation requires that
"[a]ppropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appro-
priations were made except as otherwise provided by law."15 2 Another
statute codifies the concept that appropriations must be spent within the
time period specified by Congress. 53
The specification of object and time limitations, as well as an amount
limitation, for each appropriation assures that the public fisc will not be
obligated without legislative authorization and that there will be a legisla-
tive authorization for all activity undertaken in the name of the United
States. The amount limitation of an appropriation thus may reflect more
than a budget constraint; it may reflect Congress' estimation of the object's
value at a given time" or Congress' determination that additional financ-
ing from the public fisc is not desirable. 55
1680)).
49. "Explanation," Nov. 11, 1795, in 8 A. HAMILTON, WORKS 122, 128 (H.C. Lodge ed. 1885)
(emphasis in original). The quoted statement is from Hamilton's response to an anonymous open
letter criticizing his performance as Secretary of the Treasury. See CONTROL OF FEDERAL EXPENDI-
TURES, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 130 n.62 (F. Powell ed. 1939); see also THE FEDERALIST No.
78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("The legislature not only commands the purse but
prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.").
50. Since the First Congress, appropriations acts have always incorporated or specified particular
object limitations; Congress has never simply enacted a gross expenditure ceiling. Although the first
general appropriations bill broke down the total sum ($639,000) into only four line-items, Act of Sept.
29, 1789, 1 Stat. 95, "[t]his early dependence upon the Treasury [to allocate the amount appropriated]
seems to have arisen because of the unpreparedness and lack of time on the part of the members [of
the First Congress]." V. BROWNE, supra note 47, at 35. See infra Section III for further analysis of
Congress' obligation to define both object and amount.
51. Act of March 3, 1809, 2 Stat. 535. This statute was enacted largely in response to the argu-
ment, first pressed by Alexander Hamilton and later renewed by members of President Jefferson's
Cabinet, that the Executive was not bound by every detail in the legislative breakdown of aggregate
appropriation amounts. See L. WILMERDING, supra note 4, at 22-23, 73-76. No one, however, sug-
gested that the President could disregard all object limitations. See id. at 20-49.
52. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1982). The Anti-Deficiency Act also embraces the principle of object
limitation. See infra note 157.
53. 31 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982). The Constitution specifically provides that the duration of army
appropriations must be limited to two years, U.S. CONsT art. I, § 8, cl. 12; the general concept of
some time limitation is implicit in the concept of "Appropriations," in order to make the specification
of object and amount meaningful. From the First Congress, operating funds have usually been appro-
priated annually.
54. When Congress appropriates a sum for a particular government agency or activity, it may not
merely be saying, "This is all the public fisc can afford at this time." Rather, it may be saying, "This
is all the activity is worth," or "Government action costing any more is not socially desirable at this
time."
55. Congress may choose to govern in ways that do not involve federal financing or activity by the
operating arm of the federal government, see supra note 20 and accompanying text. For instance,
Congress might require private companies to provide health insurance for all employees rather than
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Despite the several structural prerequisites for federal action and the
financing of that action,5" the federal budget has grown faster than the
nation's population or aggregate economy.57 The growth in the federal
establishment itself has been much slower.58 Since the mid-20th century,
federal purchases of goods and services have barely increased as a percent-
age of gross national product,59 and the federal workforce has grown at a
far lower rate than either gross national product or total federal spend-
ing.60 While any system of popular control over the purse may tend to-
ward growth in spending and budget deficits, 1 it is arguable that a differ-
ent constitutional structure-without a separation between executive
power and spending authority-might have led to an even larger federal
establishment and a larger federal claim on the nation's productive capaci-
ties. Moreover, as this Article later suggests, some of the recent growth in
federal spending may have been accomplished not because of Congress'
underwrite such insurance from the public fise. Or Congress might eliminate Social Security and
instead require employers or employees to create and contribute to private retirement accounts which
would yield exactly the same distribution of benefits as Social Security provides. See also Hart, supra
note 9, at 525-30 (discussing ways Congress can use state law to accomplish federal objectives).
56. In addition to the requirement of legislative appropriations, there are other structural prereq-
uisites for growth of the federal government. See supra text accompanying notes 9-16.
57. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT, FISCAL YEAR 1989, Historical Tables, Table 1.2 (1988) [hereinafter 1989 BUDGET] (federal
outlays as percentage of gross national product grew from approximately 10% in 1940 to approxi-
mately 23% in 1987). Compare id. Historical Tables, Table 6.1 (total federal outlays in constant
dollars increased ten-fold since 1940) with ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT FOR 1988, Table
B-30 (1988) (showing approximately 85% increase in population since 1940). See generally L. KIM-
MEL, FEDERAL BUDGET AND FISCAL POLICY: 1789-1958 (1959).
58. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1988, Table B-40 (1988)
(total number of federal employees increased three-fold since 1940). In recent years the bulk of the
growth in the federal budget has been in income transfer programs. See 1989 BUDGET, supra note 57,
Historical Tables, Table 16.1 (showing domestic transfer payments grew from less than one-fifth of
total federal spending in 1951 to nearly two-fifths of total federal spending in 1987).
59. See 1989 BUDGET, supra note 57, Historical Tables, Table 16.2 (federal purchases of goods
and services was 8.2% of gross national product in 1951, and 8.5% in 1987).
60. Compare ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1988, Table B-40
(1988) (showing approximately 50% growth in federal workforce between 1951 and 1987) with id.
Table B-2 (gross national product in constant dollars increased by over 200% during same period)
and 1989 BUDGET, supra note 57, Historical Tables, Table 6.1 (total federal outlays in constant
dollars increased by 250% during same period).
61. Some public choice theorists argue that the requirement of legislative appropriations does not
effectively check either growth in expenditure or growth in budget deficits. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN &
G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS: THE SOURCES OF
GOVERNMENT GROWTH (T. Borcherding ed. .1977); J. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN
DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD XEYNES 173-76 (1977). However, the factual premises
of these arguments-that prior to the modern era there was a "moral" prescription for balanced
budgets, and that in the modern era there has been continual, significant growth in total spending and
total government debt-have been questioned. See Stein, The Decline of the Budget-Balancing Doc-
trine, in FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, 35-53 (J. Buchanan & R.
Wagner eds. 1978) (no greater balanced-budget doctrine before 1929 than after); Eisner & Pieper, A
New View of the Federal Debt and Budget Deficits, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 11 (1984) (real value of net
debt has declined since World War II); Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593, 622-23 nn. 184-86 (1988).
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power of the purse, but in contravention of Congress' constitutional re-
sponsibility to exercise control over federal expenditures.8 2
D. The Principles of the Public Fisc and of Appropriations Control
As shown above, appropriations do not merely set aside particular
amounts of money; they define the character, extent, and scope of author-
ized activities. If the Executive could avoid limitations imposed by Con-
gress in appropriations legislation-by independently financing its activi-
ties with private funds, transferring funds among appropriations accounts,
or selling government assets and services-this would vitiate the founda-
tional constitutional decision to empower Congress to determine what ac-
tions shall be undertaken in th name of the United States.
Federal agencies may not resort to nonappropriation financing because
their activities are authorized only to the extent of their appropriations.
Accordingly, without legislative permission, a federal agency may not re-
sort to private funds to supplement its appropriations because it has no
authority to engage in the additional activity on which it would spend the
private funds. This restriction applies even where the nonappropriated
funds would be used to finance activities resembling or duplicating activi-
ties that are underwritten with appropriated funds.
Similarly, the appropriations requirement prohibits the executive
branch from transferring funds from one "object" of appropriation to an-
other. A transfer of funds simultaneously increases the budget of one ac-
tivity and decreases that of another, thus violating the terms of both ap-
propriations. Similarly, an agency may not sell government assets or
government goods and services and finance additional activities with the
proceeds; such sales would contravene both the terms of the original ap-
propriation and the terms of the appropriation for the activity on which
the proceeds of the sale would be spent.
These conclusions derived from the Constitution's appropriations clause
may be summarized in two governing principles. First, the Principle of
the Public Fisc: All funds belonging to the United States-received from
whatever source, however obtained, and whether in the form of cash, in-
tangible property, or physical assets-are public monies, subject to public
control and accountability. This principle implies that all monies received
by the United States are in "the Treasury," to use the language of the
Constitution. "The Treasury" includes not only tax receipts, but also any
borrowing on the credit of the United States and proceeds from the sale of
government goods and services and gifts to the government. Second, the
Principle of Appropriations Control: All expenditures from the public
fisc must be made pursuant to a constitutional "Appropriation[ ] made by
62. See infra text accompanying notes 19,5-206 (various forms of "backdoor" spending may re-
present abdication of Congress' power of the purse).
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Law." Together, the two principles prescribe that there may be no spend-
ing in the name of the United States except pursuant to legislative
appropriation.
So understood, the Constitution's appropriations requirement comple-
ments the companion "Statement and Account" requirement, placed in the
same clause of the Constitution, which provides that "a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall
be published from time to time."6 Both clauses make Congress accounta-
ble to the public for all federal spending. The appropriations requirement
mandates that government expenditure be authorized by legislative action.
The statement and account requirement provides a means of enforcing the
requirement that spending be duly authorized. The appropriations clause
uses the phrase "Money . . .drawn from the Treasury," while the state-
ment and account clause uses the phrase "Receipts and Expenditures of
public Money." If there could be "public Money" that is not deposited in
"the Treasury" prior to expenditure, then the scope of these complemen-
tary constitutional provisions" would differ. As a matter of textual coher-
ence, the two phrases should be regarded as synonymous.6 5
As a consequence of the appropriations requirement, all "production"
of government must be pursuant to legislative authority, even where the
additional production is financed with donations and thus appears costless
to the Treasury. 6 The requirement of legislative appropriation is not lim-
ited to occasions when Congress has invoked the taxing power or other
63. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (emphasis added).
64. The complementary nature of the two requirements is indicated not only by their placement
and wording but also by their broader functions. Without statement and account review, executive
agencies could evade the object and amount limitations of appropriations. See 19 ANNALS OF CONG.
1330-31 (1809) ("[U]nless the House examine if the amount of appropriation is exceeded by the
expenditure; or if it be misapplied, that is, if money appropriated for one object be expended for
another; unless we do this, sir, our control over the public purse is a mere name-an empty shadow.")
(statement of Rep. J. Randolph); see also L. WILMERDING, supra note 4, at 199 passim ("The Effort
to Control After Expenditure").
It may be noted that at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the appropriations requirement was
initially considered in tandem with revenue-raising provisions. It was originally proposed on July 3,
1787, that both revenue and expenditure bills be initiated in the House. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 523 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). However, the appropriations re-
quirement was soon separated from the provision requiring that tax bills originate in the House (now
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 1). The statement and account clause was not proposed until September
14, 1787; as initially proposed by George Mason, it would have provided that "an Account of the
public expenditures should be annually published." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 618-19 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). Madison does not record any discussion of why the
statement and account clause was subsequently appended to the appropriations requirement in section
9. Id. at 619.
65. Equivalent coverage of the two clauses does not, by itself, necessarily imply that both include
all public spending. For instance, the coverage of each might be limited to monies raised from taxes
and government borrowing. However, the statement and account clause refers broadly to "expendi-
tures of public Money" (emphasis added). It would be strange indeed if the Constitution required an
accounting of only some expenditures by the executive branch.
66. The appropriations requirement thus encompasses all donated funds that are spent in the
name of the United States, even if the funds are transferred directly from the private donor to the
third party.
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coercive powers. The appropriations requirement implements not only the
idea of "no taxation without representation," but also the foundational
premise of a federal government which is limited to constitutionally au-
thorized activities.
Although absolute, the constitutional Principles of the Public Fisc and
of Appropriations Control are inherently limited in scope. First, they en-
compass only monies which, pursuant to positive law, belong to the
United States. 7 Under our constitutional order, Congress may not dispose
of funds that are not funds of the United States."8 There are many ways,
of course, in which monies might become part of the public fisc."9
Second, and related, the principles apply only to spending undertaken
in the name of the United States 70-federal expenditures themselves, not
consequential expenditures by third parties of monies originally provided
by the federal government. Thus, the initial payment of federal grant
funds from the United States to a recipient must be authorized by an
appropriation from Congress, but no appropriation is required in order
for the recipient to spend the funds (in accordance with the terms of the
federal grant). The recipient is using funds provided by the federal gov-
ernment; but the funds are no longer part of the public fisc, and the recip-
ient is not acting in the name of the federal government. 1
67. For instance, overpayment of federal income taxes results in money being physically received
by the United States which does not legally belong to it; consequently, overpayments may be refunded
without appropriation. See 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 439 (1871). Thus, although Congress has enacted a
permanent appropriation for refund of amounts erroneously deposited to the Government, see 31
U.S.C. § 1322 (1982), it need not have done so. See also 4 B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 112-56 (1981). Similarly, funds held by the United States in escrow or
in other trust arrangements in the course of litigation do not belong to the United States. See 60
Comp. Gen. 15, 26 (1980) ("Moneys properly held by a Federal agency in a trust capacity are not
required to be deposited as miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury."). The public fisc is not implicated
in these circumstances.
Conversely, the Principle of Appropriations Control does not require reappropriation of amounts
refunded to a federal agency by a third party where the initial agency expenditure was erroneous or
illegal, as, for instance, where a federal contractor refunds amounts mistakenly overpaid by a federal
agency. See GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, at 5-66.
68. Although it may be difficult in a particular case to determine whether monies are part of the
public fise, the problem is not unusual or necessarily difficult to solve. Indeed, a comparable determi-
nation must be made in all prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982), which broadly prohibits all
forms of theft of any "money, or thing of value of the United States" (emphasis added). See also
Indictment-Count 2, United States v. Poindexter, No. 88-0080 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 16, 1988) (alleg-
ing violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641) (copy on file with author).
69. For instance, Congress may enact a tax statute, raising revenue through legal coercion. Or a
private entity may voluntarily transfer monies to the United States in the form of a gift. The United
States may receive funds from the sale of government goods and services or pursuant to a contract
between the government and a private entity. The government also may invest public funds (pursuant
to appropriation) in capital assets; the return on such investments belongs to the United States. Under
the Principle of the Public Fisc and the Principle of Appropriations Control, all such monies may be
spent only as authorized by legislation.
70. Although it may sometimes be a close factual question whether funds are being spent "in the
name of the United States," this question, like that at supra note 68, is not novel or incomprehensible.
See infra note 93.
71. Thus, if a recipient of federal funds violates the terms of his federal grant in spending the
funds, it would not be proper to charge the recipient with theft from the government under 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 (1982), see supra note 68, unless the requisite criminal intent was formed prior to receipt of the
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These two inherent limitations of the Principles of the Public Fisc and
of Appropriations Control reflect the constitutional premise of limited
government.72 "The Treasury" does not consist of all potential govern-
ment revenue-any more than the "federal government" consists of all
potential exercise of government power. Rather, "the Treasury"-or
"public Money," to use the term in the statement and account
clause-consists only of those resources which, through constitutional
processes, have been transferred to the government.
Hence when the government foregoes opportunities to obtain additional
taxes, gifts, or other funds for the public fisc, Congress need not appropri-
ate (or, for that matter, keep a statement and account of) these foregone
government revenues. Just as congressional inaction may be as effective a
method of governing as the affirmative exercise of congressional power
through legislation,73 so also "tax expenditures"7 4 may allocate resources
and affect income distribution in the same manner as direct spending.
While as a matter of policy Congress may want to treat tax expenditures
as equivalent to government spending,7 5 the Constitution does not require
any such treatment. The creation of a tax "loophole" is often a legislative
act under article V'7 But the actual funds constituting "tax expenditures"
never belong to the United States, and the actual expenditure of these
funds is accomplished by private persons or nongovernment entities and
not in the name of the United States. 7
The scope of the appropriations requirement would be much larger if
the Constitution were based not on the premise of limited government but
on the opposite premise-that all activity has political and governmental
origins unless Congress decides otherwise. Under the latter premise, all
resources would belong to the government until and unless the govern-
ment transferred resources to nongovernment entities. The status of tax
funds. Of course, depending on the terms of the grant, the recipient might be prosecuted for fraud or
some other crime.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 9-19.
73. See also supra note 19 (as political or policy matter Congress' failure to act may be consid-
ered equivalent to congressional action).
74. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705 (1970); 1989 Buix;r, supra note 57,
at 6d-9 ("Tax expenditures are defined as amounts attributable to provisions of the Federal income
tax laws that allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or that provide a
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability."). See generally M. GRAETZ,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 40-56 (2d ed. 1988).
75. See infra note 264.
76. Because tax expenditures are defined as deviations from a comprehensive income base, and the
original personal income tax law enacted by Congress was largely comprehensive, most tax expendi-
tures have been, as a factual matter, enacted by Congress-just as spending legislation is enacted. See
M. GRAETZ, supra note 74, at 53 ("tax expenditures can be eliminated in two ways-by either
repealing the tax expenditure or repealing the tax").
77. Similarly, the costs imposed by government regulation on nongovernmental entities do not fall
within the appropriations clause, though as a matter of policy Congress may wish to treat them as if
they did. See R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 133-58 (1983) (dis-
cussion of "regulatory budget").
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expenditures-indeed, of all foregone revenues-would be very differ-
ent." That tax expenditures are not subject to the requirement of appro-
priations control is not an oversight of the framers, revealing a failure to
understand the concepts of opportunity costs and indirect subsidy; rather,
it is a direct consequence of a fundamental tenet of our constitutional
order.
E. The Power To Deny Appropriations
The genius of regulating executive branch activities by limitations on
appropriations is that these limitations can be bureaucratically"9 and con-
temporaneously enforced without the need for litigation or after-the-fact
congressional investigations in every case.80 Appropriations limitations
constrain every government action and activity and, assuming general
compliance with legislative prescriptions, constitute a low-cost vehicle for
effective legislative control over executive activity. Should the Executive
choose to ignore congressional declarations of policy, Congress may enact
purse-string limitations.8'
Historically, however, Congress has been reluctant to use appropria-
tions control to limit federal activities in certain sensitive areas."2 Only
since World War II has Congress consistently enacted appropriations lim-
itations as a means of controlling some aspects of foreign policy. 3 During
78. Similarly, if all action in the polity were considered to be, as an original matter, the action of
the government (until and unless the government decided differently), then the "state action" require-
ment would have a very different constitutional significance. Cf. S. WOLIN, supra note 9, at 353-54
(contrasting liberal societies in which the "private" sphere is primary with totalitarian societies in
which the government seeks "to render the political factor all-pervasive and the ultimate referent of
existence").
79. I refer to accounting and budgeting officials within federal agencies, as well as to the Office of
Management and Budget, which oversees allocation of appropriations and budget development in the
executive branch. See generally F. MOSHER, A TALE OF Two AGENCIES 99-123 (1984). Oversight of
executive compliance with appropriations limitations is provided, to a degree, by the General Account-
ing Office. See infra text accompanying notes 226-47.
80. Of course, enforcement in any system will inevitably be imperfect and incomplete, and, as the
Iran-contra hearings of 1987 demonstrate, misuse of government funds may occur. See IRAN-CONTRA
REPORT, supra note 1, at 405-07 (violations of "Boland Amendment"); id. at 411-14 (unauthorized
use of donated funds). It is interesting to note, however, that the activities managed by Lt. Col. Oliver
North were conducted outside the bureaucratic channels of the CIA and, to the extent that proceeds
from the sale of government assets were used, they were first "laundered." See IRAN-CONTRA RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 31-58 (explaining how in face of "Boland II" the CIA ceased contra-aid
efforts and "[tlhe NSC staff [took contra policy] underground," id. at 31); see also id. at 117-36
(chapter entitled "Keeping 'USG Fingerprints' Off the Contra Operation: 1984-1985"); id. at 137-53
(chapter entitled "Keeping 'USG Fingerprints' Off the Contra Operation: 1986").
81. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1865 ("Boland I" prohib-
iting CIA use of appropriated funds "for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicara-
gua"); Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1935 ("Boland II" prohibit-
ing the CIA, Department of Defense "or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in
intelligence activities" from spending "funds available" in support of the contras).
82. For an examination of legislative failure to control executive activity in foreign affairs in
general, and the Iran-contra affair in particular, see Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in
Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988).
83. See generally Nobleman, Financial Aspects of Congressional Participation in Foreign Rela-
tions, 289 ANNALS 145 (1953). The most common examples are in the area of foreign aid, enacted
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the Vietnam War, Congress cut off funds for Cambodian operations"
only after a statutory "declaration of policy"-not tied to continued fund-
ing-had failed to achieve that end.85
The "object" limitation used in the Cambodian situation (and used a
decade later to constrain United States involvement in support of the
armed Nicaraguan opposition, or contras) is especially powerful: the de-
nial of any appropriated funds for a specific purpose.86 Generally, a com-
plete denial provides that no appropriated funds may be used for an activ-
ity that otherwise would be a proper object of expenditure from a lump-
sum appropriation for the agency. 7 Where Congress thus denies appro-
priations, the denial is not merely a determination that the public fisc
cannot afford spending any money on that activity. By such appropria-
tions legislation, Congress decides that, under our constitutional scheme,
for the duration of the appropriations denial, the specific activity is no
longer within the realm of authorized government actions.
This legislative action denies the Executive all means of engaging in the
prohibited activity because employee salaries and other overhead costs are
almost invariably paid out of appropriated funds.88 When government
employees act on behalf of the United States, they are subject to every
limitation that applies to appropriated funds. In principle, a government
employee acting in an official capacity-including the President-may not
spend one minute to make one phone call to solicit private funds (for use
pursuant to Congress' general "spending power." See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see, e.g.,
Mutual Security Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-665, ch. 937, § 105(b)(1), 68 Stat. 832, 835; Foreign
Aid Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 620, 75 Stat. 444-45; Foreign Assistance Act of
1963, § 301(e), Pub. L. No. 88-205, 77 Stat. 386 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2)
(1982) (first Hickenlooper Amendment)).
84. See Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 130, 134.
85. See Act of Nov. 17, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-156, § 601(a), 85 Stat. 423, 430 (Mansfield
Amendment); see also Pub. L. No. 92-156, § 501(a), 85 Stat. 423, 427 (1971) (Fullbright proviso
declaring, inter alia, that "nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of
actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of United States Forces
from Southeast Asia . . ."). The history and relationship of these provisions is discussed in Eagleton,
The August 15 Compromise and the War Powers of Congress, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1973); Note,
Presidential Power to Make War, 7 IND. L. REv. 900 (1974).
86. See supra note 81 ("Boland" amendments). It has been argued, however, that "Boland II,"
cutting off appropriated funds for the contras, did not by its terms encompass the National Security
Council in the White House. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 489-99 (Minority Re-
port). Where the intent is to deny all funds for a particular object, it would be desirable not to include
unnecessary descriptive language (which may be construed as terms of limitation), such as Boland II's
reference to agencies "involved in intelligence activities."
87. See, e.g., 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 180 (1981) (antilobbying restriction in appropriations for
Community Services Agency (CSA) prohibits all such activity by CSA, even though in absence of such
restriction, lobbying would be, under CSA's organic legislation, an authorized activity). See also infra
note 95.
88. The administrative costs of nearly every government activity and agency are funded in one of
the thirteen appropriations bills enacted each year. See S. COLLENDER, THE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL
BUIET 44 (1987 ed.). Moreover, there are statutes that prohibit augmentation of employee salaries
with outside funding. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1982) (prohibiting all supplementation of govern-
ment employee's salaried compensation for his government activity). In addition, a provision of the
Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits uncompensated service by government employees. See infra note 150;
infra text accompanying notes 147-52.
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of the government or directly for a third party) for an activity explicitly
denied appropriated funds.8 9
Even where Congress grants authority to an agency to spend donations
or other receipts not deposited first in the Treasury,90 that authority is not
sufficient to permit continuation of an activity which has been denied all
appropriated funds. Pursuant to the terms of the congressional action de-
nying appropriations, an agency may not use donated funds to engage in a
prohibited activity if any appropriated funds (including funds for em-
ployee salaries) would be expended in administering the donated funds. 1
Quite simply, the letter of the appropriation limitation applies to every
penny of appropriations. Unless Congress clearly intends to permit con-
tinued use of gift funds for an activity explicitly denied "appropriated"
funds, an agency has no authority to invoke its gift authority to avoid such
object restrictions on its appropriations.
This is not an exaltation of form over substance; the form (an appropri-
ations limitation) and the substance (a limitation on executive authority)
are entirely congruent. Suppose, for instance, that Congress enacts an ap-
propriation for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
which provides that "no funds appropriated herein" may be used for fam-
ily planning programs or activities. This provision would prohibit HHS
employees from administering or otherwise supporting the now-unautho-
rized family planning activity.92 Although an employee of HHS perhaps
could raise private funds for family planning programs by making a few
phone calls, the employee is prohibited from doing these things while act-
ing in his or her official capacity. 93
In sum, there is no de minimis exception to appropriation limitations,
just as there is no de minimis exception to the constitutional appropria-
tions requirement. Appropriations for federal agencies, like conditions in
89. As previously noted, Congress may itself violate the Constitution by failing to provide funds
for presidential activities independently authorized by the Constitution. A presidential claim of such a
violation, however, does not give the President constitutional authority to spend in the absence of
appropriation. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 124-34.
91. Where Congress has authorized a revolving fund for a particular activity, see infra text ac-
companying notes 114-21, it is possible that all employees are paid from the revolving fund account,
rather than from annual appropriations. Nonetheless, because revolving funds are a form of "perma-
nent appropriation," see infra text accompanying notes 167-72, a legislative prohibition on use of any
appropriations for an activity encompasses monies in revolving funds. The so-called "non-
appropriated fund" doctrine under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1508 (1982), see infra note
169, is misleading to the extent it suggests otherwise.
92. The example given involves a domestic activity for which the President is given no constitu-
tional responsibility beyond executing the law.
93. Whether an employee is acting in his capacity as an employee may be a difficult question, but
it certainly is not an unanswerable one. Relevant considerations might be whether an employee un-
dertakes the activity during office hours, uses official stationery (purchased with appropriated funds),
identifies himself or herself as a government employee, or makes representations purporting to act on
behalf of the United States. Such determinations must routinely be made in conflict-of-interest and
other cases. See, e.g., 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 20 (1977).
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spending programs for nonfederal entities,"4 are important sources of reg-
ulatory authority because the expenditure of any and all monies is condi-
tioned upon compliance with prescribed policy. Where Congress prohibits
use of any appropriated funds for an activity,95 the Executive simply has
no authority to finance the prohibited activity with either private or public
funds. 6 By placing the power of the purse in Congress, the Constitution
makes Congress accountable for the actions of the operating branch of the
federal government.
II. APPROPRIATIONS CONTROL: THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
To a large extent, Congress' implementation of the appropriations re-
quirement is consistent with the constitutional theory developed in Section
I. Two types of legislation reveal Congress' historic understanding of the
constitutional significance of legislative appropriations: particular appro-
priations statutes (or other legislation creating spending authority), and
what may be termed "framework" statutes. This Section examines the
latter. Framework statutes do not themselves grant spending authority;
rather, they establish broadly applicable and usually process-oriented
standards and rules. These general statutes provide the operational and
definitional framework for the enactment and expenditure of appropria-
tions and govern both the legislative appropriations process and the ex-
penditure process within federal agencies." Without an understanding of
these framework statutes,98 appropriations acts and other specific funding
provisions cannot be properly interpreted or applied.
94. See supra text accompanying note 29.
95. Is failure to appropriate any money the same as an explicit denial of appropriations? The
answer is "no" if the unmentioned activity is nonetheless within the terms of activities that are
funded. There is no need for Congress to list every activity that might conceivably be within "support
for families," for example. However, failure to list and fund an activity is the same as explicitly
denying funding for it if the unmentioned activity does not fall within other activities that are funded.
For instance, if Congress simply did not mention family planning activities in the budget of HHS, any
government support for such activities would be prohibited unless some other funded activity (such as
"support for families") encompasses family planning programs. Obviously, the scope of funded activi-
ties is an issue of statutory interpretation.
96. See also Tribe, Reagan Ignites a Constitutional Crisis, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1987, A31, col.
2 (Boland amendment applies to "government revenues devoted to paying the salaries and expenses of
intelligence operatives whenever their actions-such as the solicitation of contributions-[would aid
the contras].").
97. Kenneth Dam has identified two such framework statutes as constitutional with a small "c".
See Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHS. L. REv. 271, 272, 278-82 (1977) (discuss-
ing Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 31 U.S.C.) and Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 298 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1, 2, & 31 U.S.C.)).
98. In addition to the legislation that Dam has identified and the statutes discussed in text, I
include as framework legislation other provisions that define terms used in appropriations acts, see,
e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1511(a) (1982) (defining "appropriations"); that set forth rules of construction, see,
e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (1982) (providing that law may be construed as appropriation or permission
to obligate United States contractually "only if the law specifically states that an appropriation Js
made or that such a contract may be made"); that limit the conditions under which an appropriation
may be legally obligated and spent, see, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982) ("Documentary evidence re-
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Two framework statutes originally enacted in the 19th and early 20th
centuries-the Miscellaneous Receipts statute99 and the Anti-Deficiency
Act 00-are especially important in ascertaining Congress' historical un-
derstanding and application of the appropriations requirement. Like the
earliest framework statute, which mandated that appropriated funds be
spent only on the "objects" for which the funds were appropriated,01 the
Miscellaneous Receipts statute and the Anti-Deficiency Act addressed a
chronic problem Congress faced throughout the 19th century: ensuring
that executive agencies did not obligate the public fisc except in the
amounts appropriated by Congress.1 2
The general requirement in the Miscellaneous Receipts statute that any
agent of the United States "receiving money for the Government from any
source" shall deposit the funds into the Treasury03 articulates the Princi-
ple of the Public Fisc: All monies of the federal government must be
claimed as public revenues, subject to public control through constitutional
processes. The Anti-Deficiency Act, on the other hand, articulates the
Principle of Appropriations Control: No public funds may be expended
except pursuant to legislative appropriations. As presently codified, the
primary prohibition of the Anti-Deficiency Act makes it unlawful for a
federal agency to "make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceed-
ing an amount available in an appropriation . *. . ."" These statutory
assertions of the two constitutional principles are limited by certain open-
ended statutory exceptions to the requirement of the Miscellaneous Re-
ceipts statute and by narrow application of the prohibitions of the Anti-
Deficiency Act.
A. The Miscellaneous Receipts Statute and Its Exceptions
The Act of March 3, 1849 provided that all funds "received from cus-
toms, from the sales of public lands, and from all miscellaneous sources,
quirement for Government obligations"); or that cancel spending authority, see, e.g., Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (to be codified as
amended in 1987 in scattered sections of 2, 31 and 42 U.S.C.) ("Gramm-Rudman-Hollings" law).
The historical development of the legal framework governing enactment and administration of appro-
priations is examined in Stith, supra note 61.
99. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 110, 9 Stat. 398 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b)
(1982)).
100. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1484 § 4, 33 Stat. 1214, (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§
1341-1351 (1982)). Although the Anti-Deficiency Act as such was not enacted until the early 20th
century, the rule against deficiencies was contained in several 19th century statutes. See infra notes
137-38.
101. Act of Mar. 3, 1809, 2 Stat. 535 (current version codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1982)).
See supra text accompanying note 52.
102. See generally L. WILMERDING, supra note 4. Wilmerding gives due recognition to the Anti-
Deficiency Act as an assertion of legislative control over spending. The significance of the Miscellane-
ous Receipts statute has not been widely understood, however; Wilmerding does not cite or allude to
it.
103. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (1982).
104. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (1982).
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for the use of the United States, shall be paid into the treasury of the
United States . *."..",5 Because it encompassed all receipts, the statute
took on the unfortunately bland and unrevealing name of the "Miscella-
neous Receipts" statute. As now codified in section 3302 of title 31 of the
United States Code ("Money and Finance"), the statute provides that any
"official or agent of the Government receiving money for the Government
"1I06from any source shall deposit the money into the Treasury ....
Pursuant to the requirements of the Miscellaneous Receipts statute, all
funds belonging to the United States-received "for the use of the United
States" or "for the Government"-are part of the public fisc. All such
funds must be deposited into the federal Treasury, from there to be ap-
propriated by law.10 7 Thus, for example, an agency may not circumvent
legislative control by obtaining federal receipts directly from a tax collec-
tor. Moreover, an agency may not augment its appropriations with contri-
butions from nongovernmental entities or with other nonappropriated
funds. Any such monies received by an agency must be deposited into the
Treasury.'0 8 The general requirement of the Miscellaneous Receipts stat-
ute thus both articulates and enforces 09 the Principle of the Public Fisc.
The most important aspect of the Miscellaneous Receipts statute, how-
105. 9 Stat. 398 (emphasis added). This provision was recodified as section 3617 of the Revised
Statutes of 1873, with the language abbreviated to refer to funds "received from whatever source for
use of the United States . . . ." See supra note 103; infra note 106 (current codification).
106. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (1982) (emphasis added). The term "for the use of the United States"
was shortened to "for the Government" as part of an effort to "eliminate unnecessary words." See id.
reporter's notes.
Subsection (a) of § 3302, which requires that such funds be held safely prior to deposit into the
Treasury, uses the term "public money" rather than "money for the Government." This subsection is
derived from a provision enacted prior to the original Miscellaneous Receipts statute, Act of Aug. 6,
1846, ch. 90, § 6, 9 Stat. 59, 60, and apparently uses the term "public money" synonymously with the
term "money for the Government" in the Miscellaneous Receipts provision. See also supra text ac-
companying notes 63-65 (term "public Monies" in Constitution's statement and account clause ap-
pears synonymous with term "Money . . .drawn from the Treasury" in Constitution's appropria-
tions clause).
107. See CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1848) ("This bill sought simply to put all the
money into the public treasury, and draw it from the public treasury by law, according to the require-
ments of the Constitution, so as to get rid of the difficulty of spending two or three millions without
authority of law, as we now did.") (remarks of Rep. Toombs).
108. That the Miscellaneous Receipts statute requires funds to be deposited with other revenues
in the Treasury (for disposition by Congress) rather than credited directly to an agency's appropria-
tions account (thereby being available for agency expenditure) is explained in a 1916 opinion by the
predecessor to the Comptroller General, the Comptroller of the Treasury:
[The Miscellaneous Receipts statute] does not mean that the moneys are to be added to a fund
that has been appropriatedfrom the Treasury and may be in the Treasury or outside. It seems
to me that it can only mean that they shall go into the general fund of the Treasury which is
subject to any disposition which Congress might choose to make of it . . . . If Congress in-
tended that these moneys should be returned to the appropriation from which a similar
amount had once been expended it could have been readily so stated ....
22 Comp. Dec. 379, 381 (1916), quoted in GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, at 5-64.
109. The Miscellaneous Receipts statute provides two types of civil penalties for its violation:
removal from office and forfeiture of the improperly deposited funds. See 31 U.S.C. § 3302(d) (1982).
Although the statute does not itself provide criminal penalties for its violation, there is a general
criminal prohibition on theft of government funds. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982), discussed at supra note
68; cf. 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) (criminal penalties for violation of Anti-Deficiency Act).
The Yale Law Journal
ever, may not be its general requirement that all public funds be deposited
into the Treasury, but rather the exceptions to this requirement that Con-
gress has enacted from time to time. These statutory exceptions expressly
permit particular federal agencies to receive and spend funds from private
and other nongovernment sources, rather than deposit them into the Trea-
sury for subsequent appropriation by Congress. There are three major
types of legislation that create exceptions to the general requirement of the
Miscellaneous Receipts statute: first, legislation that allows agencies to re-
tain certain "collections"; second, legislation that permits agencies to cre-
ate certain "revolving funds"; and, third, legislation that grants certain
agencies "gift authority."
Congress permits some agencies that collect fees or otherwise obtain re-
ceipts in the course of their activities to retain and spend such collections
(sometimes referred to as "reimbursements") 1 ° without any further legis-
lative process."' 1 The collections are credited not to any receipt account of
the federal government, but rather, directly to the agency's appropriations
account.11 2 These funds typically are available for spending by the agency
in addition to whatever funds Congress appropriates for the agency's ac-
tivities, though Congress may in the annual appropriations act for the
agency limit the total amount of spending that can be financed by
collections.11
Revolving funds are a species of collection authority. Most revolving
funds sustain enterprises of the government which are commercial in na-
ture, such as loan programs. Generally, the initial capital contribution for
a revolving fund is made by appropriation; thereafter, continuing provi-
110. The Office of Management and Budget refers to these receipts as "offsetting collections
credited to appropriation or fund accounts" (as opposed to being credited to a government receipt
account). See 1989 BUDGET, supra note 57, at 6e-14 to 6e-15. The GAO refers to these funds as
"reimbursements." See 62 Comp. Gen. 70, 73 (1982) ("Reimbursements are sums received as a result
of commodities sold or services furnished either to the public or to another Government account,
which are authorized by law to be credited directly to a specific appropriation.").
111. Many agencies have authority to charge fees where services inure to the benefit of particular
recipients. See Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1982); New Eng-
land Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 467 F.2d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1972), affd, 415 U.S. 345
(1974); see also 48 Comp. Gen. 24 (1968) (broadly construing user charges statute). Additionally,
there are special authorizations to collect fees. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982) (Customs Service
may charge for certain services). Sometimes the statutory authorization permits such fees to be
credited directly to an agency's appropriation account; at other times the receipts must be deposited as
miscellaneous receipts. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 5009 (1982) (VA may retain parking fees) with 10
U.S.C. § 2667 (1982) (Department of Defense must deposit lease receipts in Treasury).
112. See 1989 BUDGET, supra note 57, at 6e-15 ("The outlays of the appropriations or fund
account are quantified as disbursements less offsetting collections."). This treatment is to be contrasted
with the treatment of most receipts of the government. All tax revenues of the federal government and
certain other receipts, including off-shore oil royalties, are credited to receipt accounts and hence must
be appropriated before being spent. See id. at 6e-14 to 6e-15 ("Governmental Receipts" and most
"Offsetting Receipts" are credited to receipt accounts).
113. Id. at 6e-15 ("[Offsetting collections credited to appropriations or fund accounts are] availa-
ble to [be spent] for the purpose of the account without further action by the Congress. However, it is
not unusual for the Congress to enact limitations on the obligations that can be financed by these
collections.").
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sion of the service or activity is financed by income generated by the activ-
ity itself. 14
Revolving funds and other types of collections have been legislatively
authorized to support various activities since the earliest years of the na-
tion.11 5 A number of revolving funds were created during and immediately
after the First World War to avoid the delay and uncertainty of the legis-
lative appropriations process."' During the New Deal era, creation of
these funding mechanisms (and, often, creation of government corpora-
tions to administer the funded activities) increased markedly." 7 These
new agencies of government outside the ambit of appropriations control
have been compared to "medieval kings, [who] 'lived of their own.' "118
Although many revolving funds and other government enterprises with
collection authority have been established," 9 including several large off-
budget public enterprises, 20 the gross magnitude of such collections im-
mediately available for expenditure is difficult to determine.' 2'
114. See GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, at 5-75; 1989 BUDGET, supra note 57, at 6e-14 to 6e-
15 (all laws creating revolving funds authorize crediting collections directly to expenditure accounts).
115. The first permanent revolving fund was for the operation of the Post Office. See Act of Feb.
20, 1792, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232. The original Miscellaneous Receipts statute expressly preserved this
revolving fund. See Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 110, 9 Stat. 398. Special reference to the Post Office was
deleted in subsequent codifications. Another early revolving fund was established by Act of Mar. 3,
1828, ch. 101, 4 Stat. 131 (authorizing President to dispose of surplus ships and to apply proceeds to
build vessels "which have been, or may be, authorized to be built"); see also Act of Aug. 10, 1846, ch.
178, § 5, 9 Star. 102, 104 (creating revolving fund from bequest of James Smithson) (current codifica-
tion at 20 U.S.C. § 53 (1982)).
116. See, e.g., Act of July 9, 1918, ch. 143, 40 Stat. 845, 850 ("proceeds of any [sale of war
supplies] shall be deposited to the credit of that appropriation out of which [the property was
bought]"); Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 459 (permitting ICC to establish revolv-
ing fund); Act of Mar. 21, 1918, ch. 25, § 12, 40 Stat. 451, 457-58 (creating revolving fund to finance
railroads temporarily placed under federal control). Secretary of the Treasury Carter Glass noted that
such funding mechanisms contained no amount limitation. Glass complained that they were therefore
largely subject to executive rather than legislative control. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
ANNUAL REPORT 126 (1919).
117. See generally A. WALSH, THE PUBLIc'S BUSINESS: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICES OF Gov-
ERNMENT CORPORATIONS 26-36 (1978); L. WILMERDING, supra note 4, at 187-95.
118. L. WILMERDING, supra note 4, at 187; see also R. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT
MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 615-36 (1974). Moses developed public corporations as enti-
ties with "not only the powers of a large private corporation but some of the powers of a sovereign
state. . . a new, fourth branch [of government] . . . that would. . . in significant respects, be inde-
pendent of the other three." Id. at 623-24. The key to Moses' power was his independence from state
and city appropriations processes. "If he wanted to remake the city, it was clear, he was going to have
to do the job without its money. But if he was to keep the authorities' revenues, keep them indefi-
nitely, he would have the money." Id. at 620.
119. Some of these are quite large-such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; others
are small-such as revolving fund financing of commissaries at military bases. Most direct loan pro-
grams of the federal government are financed as revolving funds. See GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note
39, at 5-75.
120. See 1989 BUDGET, supra note 57, app. pt. IV (showing receipts and outlays for "govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises," including Student Loan Marketing Association, Federal National Mort-
gage Association, Farm Credit Administration banks, and Federal Home Loan banks).
121. There is no separate, comprehensive listing of all revolving funds and other activities with
collection authority, either in the President's budget documents or in congressional budget documents.
In both sets of documents all such programs are interspersed among budget data pertaining to other
government activities. See id. app. pt. I (showing net collections and certain revolving fund receipts
interspersed among annual appropriations and other sources of spending authority); S. Doc. No. 21,
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The third and most recent form of statutory exception to the general
requirement that all public funds be deposited to the Treasury is agency
"gift authority." Congress need not enact legislation in order for the
United States government as a whole ("the Treasury") to receive gifts, for
the government has inherent authority to accept voluntary donations from
private entities. 22 In any event, the Miscellaneous Receipts statute con-
firms that such gifts must be received on behalf of the government as a
whole, not on behalf of any one agency or any particular government ac-
tivity. Under the Miscellaneous Receipts statute, even conditional contri-
butions to the United States (donations made for specific government ac-
tivities, or in-kind gifts that by their terms may not be resold) must be
deposited in the Treasury. In turn, legislative authorization is required
before the gift may be "drawn from the Treasury" and spent on its in-
tended governmental activity. 23
In this century, and especially since the New Deal, Congress has
granted statutory "gift authority" to many federal agencies.' 24 Under such
a statute, the agency is not required to deposit conditional gifts (gifts
earmarked for the general purposes or a specific purpose of the agency) in
the Treasury. Instead, the agency may spend these sums (within the terms
of the gift) without further legislative authorization. The terms of gift au-
thority vary-sometimes allowing for acceptance of any gift, 25 at other
times allowing for acceptance of only certain types of gifts.2' In all cases,
the gift authority allows the agency to spend contributions, in addition to
98th Cong., 1st Sess. pts. II & III, at 999-1024 (1985) (listing all "permanent appropriations" for
fiscal years 1983 and 1984).
122. See United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 90 (1950) ("Uninterrupted usage from the foun-
dation of the Government has sanctioned [acceptance of donations]."). See generally Amar, Of Sover-
eignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1432-37 (1987) (government as corporation with attend-
ant powers).
123. See H.R. REP. No. 2019, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1954) (citing Miscellaneous Receipts
statute):
Under existing law, the Government is authorized to accept unconditional donations, and
money so received is covered into the Treasury of the United States and used for the general
expenses of the Government. However, the acceptance of gifts conditioned upon their use for a
specified purpose is not permitted because all money received by the Treasury Department,
whether in cash or in the form of property which has been converted into cash, must be
covered into the miscellaneous receipts account to await appropriation by the Congress.
Id.
124. See Story v. Snyder, 184 F.2d 454, 461-63 (D.C. Cir.) (Appendix listing grants of gift
authority), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1950); Letter from Comptroller General to Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Limitations of Contracted and Delegated Authority, U.S. Senate Comm. on Judiciary:
Review of Federal Agencies' Gift Funds (Sept. 24, 1980) [hereinafter GAO Letter] (unpublished
report showing gift authority of 41 federal agencies) (copy on file with author).
Apparently, the most complete listing of gift funds is that in budget data published by Congress
each year. See S. Doc. No. 21, supra note 121, at 1011 (showing permanent appropriations of all
"trust funds," including gift accounts; noting that the "amounts shown are estimated and are thus
subject to revision as better data become available during the fiscal year").
125. See, e.g. Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682, 709, § 501(a)-(b) (1944) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 300cc(a)-(b) (1982)) (granting Public Health Service authority to receive donations
and to expend them "in the operation of the Service and the performance of its functions.").
126. See generally 46 Comp. Gen. 689, 689-91 (1967).
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separately appropriated funds, rather than depositing the contributions
into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. 27
Perhaps the most open-ended grant of gift authority is the statute relat-
ing to gifts made to aid the defense activities of the government. Enacted
temporarily in 1942,1"8 and reenacted as permanent legislation in 1954,
this statute authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to "accept or reject
on behalf of the United States any gift of money or other intangible per-
sonal property made on condition that it be used for a particular defense
purpose."'2 9 The legislation then directs that the Secretary of the Trea-
sury "shall from time to time pay the money in such special account to
such of the various appropriation accounts as in his judgment will best
effectuate the intent of the donors . ... 10
This statute appears to have been the first instance in which Congress
granted permission for the executive branch to receive and spend condi-
tional gifts with respect to a core government activity such as national
defense. Previously, Congress had created gift funds for only a few spe-
cialized activities, such as support for the Library of Congress.'' Money
contributed for other governmental purposes simply remained "in trust"
until Congress enacted legislation permitting its expenditure.'32 Since the
early 1950's, however, Congress has granted to many agencies the author-
ity to receive conditional gifts and to spend these on authorized purposes
of the agency without further legislative action.' 3 Indeed, at least one
127. In 1980 the GAO provided an in-depth accounting of gift revenues of 41 federal agencies.
The GAO reported that the total of gift revenues in fiscal year 1979 amounted to just over $26
million. However, the report did not claim to be a comprehensive or thorough analysis of all gifts
received by the United States, because of the many different statutory authorizations to receive gifts,
the different reporting requirements in the various statutes, and the fact that Congress has not sought
to exercise comprehensive oversight. See GAO Letter, supra note 124; see also infra note 163.
128. See Second War Powers Act of 1942, ch. 199, § 1101, 56 Stat. 176, 183-84.
129. 50 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982).
130. 50 U.S.C. § 1154 (1982). In 1946 Congress enacted a similar provision for gifts,"for the
benefit of the Department [of State]." Foreign Service Act of 1946, § 1021, 60 Stat. 999, 1031 (codi-
fied as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2697 (West Supp. 1988)); see also infra notes 163 & 203.
131. Act of Mar. 31, 1925, ch. 423, 43 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 154-163
(1982)) (permitting Trust Fund Board of Library of Congress to accept gifts for Library); see also
Act of July 16, 1935, ch. 375, § 2, 49 Stat. 477 (trust fund for national parks), repealed by Pub. L.
No. 90-209, § 2, 81 Stat. 656 (1967); Act of July 9, 1941, ch. 284, § 5, 55 Stat. 581, 581-82 (trust
fund for National Archives); Act of Nov. 7, 1941, ch. 469, § 2, 55 Stat. 760, 760-61 (trust fund for
Saint Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C.), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-621, 98 Stat. 3380
(1984). These statutes permitted gifts conditioned on their use for the particular purpose of the trust
fund; the donors could not further condition their gifts on specific items or activities within the pur-
pose of the trust fund.
132. See 11 Comp. Gen. 355, 356 (Mar. 19, 1932) (bequest to naval hospital cannot be used
without specific statutory authorization). But see Varney v. Warehime, 147 F.2d 238 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 882 (1945) ("trust funds" received by agency need not be deposited into Treasury)
(decision criticized infra note 144). In addition, the Comptroller General and the Attorney General
have issued numerous opinions holding that the government cannot accept gifts which require appro-
priations to maintain. See, e.g., 10 Comp. Gen. 395 (1931) (no authority to accept memorial); 21 Op.
Att'y Gen. 537 (1897) (no authority to accept Catholic chapel for West Point); 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 527
(1916) (no authority to accept gift of President Cleveland's birthplace).
133. See supra note 127; Op. Comp. Gen. B-149711 (Aug. 20, 1963) (listing statutory authoriza-
tions to accept gifts) (unpublished opinion), cited in GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, at 5-83; see
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agency-the United States Information Agency-is explicitly authorized
to solicit funds from nongovernmental entities and to spend them for par-
ticular purposes without further appropriation by Congress."M
The statutory authorizations135 for collections, revolving funds, and ac-
ceptance of conditional gifts set the operative contours of the Miscellane-
ous Receipts statute. Section III considers whether these legislative excep-
tions to the requirements of the Miscellaneous Receipts statute deviate
from the constitutional Principle of the Public Fisc.
B. The Anti-Deficiency Act
While the Miscellaneous Receipts statute defines the scope of the public
fisc, the Anti-Deficiency Act defines the scope of public expenditure. The
two major provisions of this Act-the rule against deficiencies and the
rule against voluntary service-were enacted in response to federal agen-
cies incurring "coercive" deficiencies and thereby circumventing amount
limitations in appropriations legislation."'
1. The Rule Against Deficiencies
Congress first enacted legislation prohibiting expenditures in excess of
appropriations in 1820.37 While that statute applied only to major fed-
eral agencies, a broader prohibition, applicable to all federal agencies, was
also 31 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1982) (listing "trust funds").
One statute permits the Secretary of the Treasury to receive donations made for the express pur-
pose of reducing the national debt. Although such gifts are nominally "conditional," their effect is the
same as unconditional gifts; such funds are simply a form of miscellaneous receipts. See 31 U.S.C. §
3113 (1982).
134. 22 U.S.C. § 2455(f) (1982) ("Foreign governments, international organizations and private
individuals, firms, associations, agencies, and other groups shall be encouraged to participate. . . and
to make contributions of funds, property, and services which the President is authorized to accept, to
be utilized to carry out the purposes of this chapter.").
135. The reader should not be confused by the term "authorization." That term means, simply,
permitted by legislation. The term "authorized" does not refer to so-called "appropriation authoriza-
tions," which are a particular form of legislation having little to do with "Appropriations" under the
Constitution. An agency's authority to spend is limited to the amount appropriated, not the amount in
any "appropriation authorization" act. These "appropriation authorizations" are enacted pursuant to
internal House and Senate rules which require that no money be appropriated which is not previously
denoted in "appropriation authorization" legislation. See W. BROWN, CONS'TTUTION, JEFFERSON'S
MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 528-44 (1981) (Rule XVI(2)); SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., SENATE MANUAL, S.
Doc. No. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1979) (Rule XVI (2)). Thus, the money amounts in "ap-
propriation authorizations" are communications from Congress to Congress itself, not to the federal
agency receiving money. See GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, at 2-11 to 2-13.
136. The term "coercive" apparently refers to agencies effectively "coercing" Congress into enact-
ing supplemental appropriations to cover the deficiencies incurred. See L. WItMERDING, supra note
4, at 137; 59 Comp. Gen. 369, 372 (1980). The term is misleading to the extent it suggests coercion
by operation of law. See infra text accompanying notes 158-62. Recent framework legislation ad-
dresses the obverse issue: ensuring that executive agencies expend all public funds appropriated. See
infra note 241.
137. Act of May 1, 1820, ch. 52, § 6, 3 Stat. 567, 568 ("[N]o contract shall hereafter be made by
the Secretary of State, or of the Treasury, or of the Department of War, or of the Navy, except under
a law authorizing the same, or under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment. .. ").
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enacted in 1870,""' and was reenacted, with criminal penalties, as the pri-
mary prohibition of the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1905. Both the 1870 and
the 1905 statutes made it unlawful for any federal agency to spend in
excess "of appropriations made by Congress."" 9 The present codification
of the Anti-Deficiency Act in title 31 of the United States Code makes it
unlawful for "[a]n officer or employee of the United States . [to] make
or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available
in an appropriation . ". . ."'" The next sentence of the current codifica-
tion specifically prohibits government contracts in advance of appropria-
tions "unless authorized by law.11 41
The anti-deficiency rule thus prevents unfunded monetary liabilities be-
yond the amounts Congress has appropriated. For instance, one common
19th-century abuse which the rule against deficiencies was designed to
prevent was the borrowing of funds by federal agencies (without legisla-
tive permission) in anticipation of future appropriations.1 42 When the Ex-
ecutive borrowed beyond amounts actually appropriated, Congress enacted
supplemental appropriations in order to repay the amounts borrowed.14 3
By prohibiting federal agencies from obligating federal funds beyond the
amounts appropriated, the rule against deficiencies ensures that Congress'
138. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 7, 16 Stat. 230, 251 ("[Ilt shall not be lawful for any
department of the government to expend in any one fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations
made by Congress for that fiscal year, or to involve the government in any contract for the future
payment of money in excess of such appropriations.").
139. Id. The Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1214, 1257-58 provided: "No Depart-
ment of the Government shall expend, in any one fiscal year, any sum in excess of appropriations
made by Congress for that fiscal year, or involve the Government in any contract or obligation for the
future payment of money in excess of such appropriation unless such contract or obligation is author-
ized by law."
140. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1982). The criminal penalty is codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
Apparently, there have been no prosecutions under this provision, but it has clearly had an in ter-
rorem effect. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1980, A18, col. I (quoting federal official's comment on
Congress' failure to enact new fiscal year appropriations: "[To permit continued government opera-
tions] is really a very serious situation-a violation of the Antideficiency Act, a criminal act. The
consequences are awesome."). It was reported that the Independent Counsel investigating the Iran-
contra affair considered charging violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act. See Crovitz, Walsh Is Above
the Law, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1988, at 34, col. 4; see also IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at
412-14 & 412 n.** (suggesting that certain contra-aid activity violated Anti-Deficiency Act). The
indictment, however, contains no such charge. See Indictment, United States v. Poindexter, No. 88-
0080 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 16, 1988) (copy on file with author); see also supra note 68.
141. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(B) (1982) provides: "[A government employee may not] involve...
[the] government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money before an appropriation is
made unless authorized by law."
142. See 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 852 (1807) (remarks of Rep. J. Randolph):
[W]here a head of department wants money, purchases may be made upon credit, with an
understanding at the banks and with the purchaser that the notes are issued for the service of
Government. . . .Here, although the money has gone out of the bank, it is, in legal phrase
still in the Treasury, until Congress meet and pass an appropriation law, when having been
paid to take up the notes it marches again out in official costume and parade.
143. See 59 Comp. Gen. 371, 372 (1980) ("The Anti-Deficiency Act was born as a result of
Congressional frustration at the constant parade of deficiency requests for appropriations. . . .The
Congress was tired of receiving appropriation requests which it could not, in good conscience,
refuse. .. ").
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power of the purse will not be undermined by unauthorized prior obliga-
tions of the Executive.
Remarkably, however, the full implications of the anti-deficiency rule
have not been explicitly acknowledged by Congress, executive agencies, or
scholars. The rule articulates the Principle of Appropriations Control,
prohibiting any expenditure beyond the amounts appropriated, even when
the unauthorized expenditures do not require supplemental appropria-
tions."' Yet both the Attorney General and the Comptroller General-in
advisory opinions concerning the legality of proposed federal expendi-
tures145 -usually have relied on the Anti-Deficiency Act for the proposi-
tion that federal officials may not impose future obligations on the Trea-
sury of the United States in excess of the amounts 'appropriated by
Congress. They have generally relied on the Miscellaneous Receipts stat-
ute for the proposition that public officials may not, without legislative
permission, fund government activities through private funds or receipts
from the conversion of government goods and services. 46
2. The Rule Against Voluntary Service
The second major prohibition of the Anti-Deficiency Act proscribes
"voluntary service" on behalf of the government. Originally enacted in
1884 and reenacted as part of the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1905, the pre-
sent codification provides that federal agencies may not accept "voluntary
service for the Government" or employment of "personal service in excess
144. Only one authority has been found that clearly denies this understanding. See Varney v.
Warehime, 147 F.2d 238, 245 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 882 (1945). This unpersuasive opin-
ion asserts that the appropriations clause and, by inference, the Anti-Deficiency Act encompass spend-
ing only from monies "arising from taxes, customs, etc." and not fees or assessments imposed pursuant
to the federal government's regulatory power (much less gifts to the government). See also Lacovara,
A Watergate Counsel Reflects: What Laws Apply to Iran Deal?, Legal Times, Feb. 23, 1987, at 15,
col. 3 ("it would be a stretch" to apply Anti-Deficiency Act, because diverting proceeds of Iran arms
sales to contras did not create new monetary obligation on Treasury).
145. The Attorney General's obligation to render legal opinions to the President derives from
article II, § 2 of the Constitution. Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 92, the Attorney
General has been authorized to give opinions to the President and the heads of executive departments.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-512 (1982). Traditionally, certain formal opinions signed by the Attorney Gen-
eral had been published in Opinions of the Attorney General. Between 1977 and 1981, many opinions
signed only by the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel were also published,
along with Attorney General opinions, in Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel; a volume contain-
ing 1982 opinions was published in mid-1988. See also infra text accompanying notes 219-25.
Comptroller General opinions may be issued at the request of executive officials, private claimants,
or others, including, perhaps most notably, Members of Congress. See GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note
39, at 1-3 to 1-5. The most significant of these are published in Decisions of the Comptroller General.
See also infra text accompanying notes 234-39.
146. See, e.g., 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 592 (1883); 59 Comp. Gen. 294 (1980); 46 Comp. Gen. 1, 3
(1967); cf. 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 126 (1981) (Reagan Administration could use private donations
to supplement appropriated funds for presidential transition activities; opinion did not cite either Anti-
Deficiency Act or Miscellaneous Receipts statute). One of the few opinions to recognize the relevance
of the rule against deficiencies to augmentation of appropriations with donations is 15 Op. Att'y Gen.
209 (1877), discussed infra note 161 and accompanying text.
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of that authorized by law" except in emergencies involving loss of human
life.147
Both the Comptroller General and the Attorney General have given
this provision a curious construction. They have concluded that the rele-
vant legislative history shows that Congress' concern was not with volun-
tary service to the government per se, but, on the contrary, with the possi-
bility that uncompensated services might ultimately be treated as creating
a right to receive payment or otherwise result in subsequent demands for
payment from Congress. 14
8
As a result of this interpretation, a statute that appears to prohibit em-
ployment of persons without appropriations to pay them has been used as
authority for the proposition that truly voluntary service, with no right or
expectation of repayment, is indeed permissible.149 Thus, for example,
when Congress fails to enact annual appropriations acts prior to the start
of the fiscal year, government employees may not continue to work (except
in cases of emergency) because it is expected that Congress will eventually
appropriate funds to compensate the employees.15 On the other hand,
where a volunteer cannot plausibly support a subsequent demand for
compensation-such as where the. volunteer in writing releases the gov-
ernment from any such obligation-the Anti-Deficiency Act's prohibition
on voluntary service is deemed not to apply. 51 In effect, the voluntary
service prohibition has been treated as a form of gift authority; that is, as
another exception to the Miscellaneous Receipts statute, allowing "re-
ceipt" (and expenditure) of in-kind services where the service is deemed to
be truly gratuitous.1 52
147. 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). The original voluntary services prohibition was enacted as a rider
to an urgent supplemental appropriations bill, Act of May 1, 1884, ch. 37, 23 Stat. 15, 17 (1884)
("hereafter no Department or officer of the United States shall accept voluntary service for the Gov-
ernment or employ personal service in excess of that authorized by law except in ... emergency
."). When reenacted as part of the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1905, the prohibition on voluntary
service was stated as follows: "Nor shall any Department or any officer of the Government accept
voluntary service for the Government or employ personal service in excess of that authorized by law,
except in cases of sudden emergency involving loss of human life or the destruction of property." Act
of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1214, 1257.
148. See, e.g., 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 8 (1981); 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 16, 17 (1980);
infra note 149.
149. See, e.g., 26 Comp. Gen. 956, 958 (1947); 54 Comp. Gen. 560 (1975); 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 51
(1913).
150. See 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1 (1981).
151. See GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, at 5-31 to 5-33 (1982).
152. But see Crovitz, supra note 140 (suggesting that uncompensated legal services provided by
Professor Laurence Tribe for independent counsel investigating Iran-contra affair violated Anti-
Deficiency Act's rule against voluntary service). If Professor Tribe's services were clearly intended to
be gratuitous, there was no violation of the rule against voluntary service under the prevailing inter-
pretation of that rule.
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C. The Anti-Deficiency Act and the Principle of Appropriations
Control
Although the major problem that Congress addressed in the Anti-
Deficiency Act was unauthorized obligation of future Treasury re-
ceipts-and the Attorney General and Comptroller General have relied on
the Act only to prohibit such unauthorized obligation-the plain terms of
the Act broadly codify the Principle of Appropriations Control, just as the
Miscellaneous Receipts statute enacts the Principle of the Public Fisc.
As first enacted, the rule against deficiencies made it unlawful "for any
department of the government to expend in any one fiscal year any sum in
"153
excess of appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year ....
The prohibition on expenditure absent an appropriation could not be
clearer. The present codification of the anti-deficiency rule, though possi-
bly less precise, is equally susceptible to a broad interpretation prohibiting
all nonappropriated spending. The first sentence of the Anti-Deficiency
Act now makes it unlawful to "make or authorize an expenditure or obli-
gation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation."154
The "unless authorized by law" proviso in the anti-deficiency rule re-
lates not to the general prohibition on expenditures beyond appropria-
tions; it refers, instead, to the redundant though less inclusive prohibition
stated in the second sentence of the Act, which bars federal officers from
"involv[ing]" the United States in contract obligations beyond the amounts
already appropriated-"unless authorized by law."1 55 Thus, the proviso
in the rule against deficiencies simply recognizes that Congress itself may
permit agencies to obligate the Treasury (though not to withdraw funds
from the Treasury) in excess of appropriations in selected circumstances.
Recognizing that Congress may authorize federal officials to enter into
contracts on behalf of the United States does not in any way dilute the
Principle of Appropriations Control stated in the first sentence of the
Anti-Deficiency Act, that no federal official or employee may obligate or
spend funds in excess of amounts sanctioned by Congress.
Similarly, the naked words of the rule against voluntary service would
appear to prohibit all donated personal service to the government except
to the extent authorized by Congress (or as necessary in an emergency).
Like the rule against deficiencies, the prohibition on voluntary service
would appear to be a part of a larger Principle of Appropriations Control.
The government cannot accept unauthorized voluntary service because all
resources available for government activity-all factors of production in
the business of "producing" federal government activity-must be author-
153. See supra note 138.
154. See supra note 140.
155. See supra note 141 (present codification); supra note 139 (second clause of Anti-Deficiency
Act of 1905).
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ized by Congress. Indeed, this second prohibition of the Anti-Deficiency
Act appears to state, with respect to personal service, both the Principle of
the Public Fisc and the Principle of Appropriations Control. By its na-
ture, personal service is simultaneously a "receipt" which is not monetary,
much less deposited to the Treasury, and an "expenditure" which is not
appropriated by Congress. The prohibition on voluntary service would
appear to prohibit unauthorized receipt and expenditure of donated per-
sonal service.
Although the Anti-Deficiency Act articulates a principle-the Principle
of Appropriations Control-that is broader than the particular concern
that led to its enactment,1 8 this principle is in no way inconsistent with
the special concern which prompted the statute's enactment. "Coercive"
deficiencies occurred during the 19th century because Congress failed to
ensure that legislative appropriations were a substantive and procedural
check upon activity by the operating branch of government. Hence the
Anti-Deficiency Act quite properly states a general requirement of legisla-
tive control over appropriations-that the Executive spend only in the
amounts and only for the objects legislatively authorized. 57 In enacting
the Anti-Deficiency Act, Congress recognized that the threat to constitu-
tional values is the same whether or not the unauthorized spending re-
quires liquidating appropriations by future Congresses. An examination
of the nature of "coercive" deficiencies reveals that they are but one conse-
quence of a failure to abide by the Constitution's command that legislative
appropriations precede spending in the name of the United States.
For the most part, these deficiencies were not legally coercive, but
merely "morally" coercive or politically coercive. An unauthorized prom-
ise to pay government funds in excess of appropriations generally would
not be enforceable against the United States. Thus, if an agency spent or
obligated an appropriations account beyond the amount authorized by
law, the United States would not be legally bound to cover the defi-
ciency.1 58 Nor does the United States have a legal obligation to repay
amounts in excess of the amount Congress has authorized it to borrow.
156. The Miscellaneous Receipts statute likewise articulates a principle-the Principle of the
Public Fisc-broader than the concerns that apparently prompted its enactment. The statute requires
that gifts as well as other receipts of the government be deposited in the Treasury, but there is no
indication in the legislative history that the Congress which originally enacted the requirement had a
particular concern with gifts.
157. Even the Comptroller General has recognized that the Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits expen-
diture in some cases where "coercive deficiencies" are not threatened. See 63 Comp. Gen. 422 (1984)
(Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits excess expenditure in any one appropriation account that is accom-
plished by transferring appropriated funds from another account).
158. See, e.g., 59 Comp. Gen. 369 (1980) (no legal obligation). As a general rule, the sovereign is
not bound by the unauthorized acts of its agent. See, e.g., Heckler v. Community Serv. of Crawford
County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 n.11 (1984); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788-90 (1981) (per
curiam); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1947); Phelps v. Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency, 785 F.2d 13, 17-19 (1st Cir. 1986); Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d 801,
807-08 (D.C. Cir. 1984); National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 663 F.2d 239, 249 (D.C.
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Nonetheless, as early Congresses well recognized, even in the absence of
any legal obligation, Congress was constrained by "moral" considerations
to fund virtually all appropriation deficiencies.15 Persons contracting with
a United States government official purporting to represent the United
States expect to be compensated."' Similarly, when persons lend money to
the government, they expect to be paid, even if they have no "right" to
repayment. Indeed, even when a private person provides personal services
or funds to the government, knowing that there exists no legal authority to
require that he be compensated, he may plausibly expect the next Con-
gress to appropriate funds necessary to reimburse him. As the Attorney
General explained in 1877, "voluntary contribution[s]" for a government
purpose "would seem to bear too much the aspect of a contract... [and]
would certainly place the Government . . .under the strongest moral ob-
ligation to use every . . effort that the donors or lenders should be reim-
bursed by Congress." '' The moral and political expectations of repay-
ment which the prohibitions of the Anti-Deficiency Act seek to prevent
cannot be revoked or waived, for they are not legal in nature. 62
Moreover, even where monetary reimbursement is neither contemplated
nor politically possible (because, for instance, the donor clearly forsakes
repayment), Congress or government officials may feel obliged to offer the
donor nonmonetary consideration.' 63 The dangers of corruption, conflict-
of-interest, favoritism, and undue discrimination in government adminis-
Cir. 1981); Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 1980). There is no suggestion in these cases that
the concept of "apparent authority" would qualify the general rule. See also Fenster & Voltz, The
Antideficiency Act: Constitutional Control Gone Astray, 11 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 155 (1979). But see 4
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 16, 19 (1980) (suggesting, with no citations or explanation, that even where
Congress has failed to enact new fiscal year appropriations, apparent authority of government officials
is basis for contract liability).
159. See, e.g., 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 1063 (1806) ("those who disburse the money, are like a
saucy boy who knows that his grandfather will gratify him, and over-runs the sum allowed him at
pleasure") (remarks of Rep. J. Randolph); 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 816 (1819) ("[W]here is the differ-
ence between drawing money from the Treasury, and making an unauthorized expenditure, which
imposes on Congress a moral obligation to appropriate money to pay it? The difference, he said, was
in name only.") (account of remarks of Rep. Clay); 1 J. SHERMAN, RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY
YEARS IN THE HOUSE, SENATE AND CABINET: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 155 (1895) ("Another abuse by
the executive departments was the habit of making contracts in advance of appropriations, thus, with-
out law, compelling Congress to sanction them or violate the public faith."); 39 CONG. REc. 3687
(1905) ("Under the law they can make these deficiencies, and Congress can refuse to allow them; but
after they are made it is very hard to refuse to allow them.") (remarks of Rep. Hemenway).
160. See, e.g., 59 Comp. Gen. 369, 372 (1980) (United States might have a "moral" commitment
to cover deficiency incurred by Australia pursuant to cooperative agreement).
161. 15 Op. Att'y Gen. 209, 211 (1877). This opinion relied on the early (1870) version of the
Anti-Deficiency Act to advise against acceptance of donations for the Army when Congress failed to
enact military appropriations in a timely manner.
162. See also United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 437-40 (1896) (affirming that Congress
has power to appropriate money for payment of claims which the federal government is morally but
not legally obligated to pay).
163. See Investigation of the U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland, Subcomm. on Int'l Operations,
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, House of Rep., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 10, 1987) (hearings concern-
ing allegations of abuse and conflict of interest in solicitation and use of gift funds by Ambassador);
N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1987, A12, col. 4 (quoting State Department concern that "some contributors
may have felt that their donations might entitle them to some special benefits").
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tration are exacerbated where people may do "favors" for the government,
or for particular agencies; indeed, these dangers may be especially great
where the circumstances of the "favor" preclude open and explicit
repayment. 16
The special concerns of Congress to avoid unfunded liabilities and to
control deficiencies in appropriation accounts should not obscure the fact
that in enacting the Anti-Deficiency Act Congress both articulated and
implemented the constitutional principle that all expenditure from the
public fisc-whatever the source of monies-should be subject to congres-
sional control through appropriations made in legislation. Any unautho-
rized government spending changes the boundaries of the federal govern-
ment without the legislative action mandated by the Constitution.
III. THE MEANING OF "APPROPRIATIONS" UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
Together, the Principles of the Public Fisc and of Appropriations Con-
trol give meaning to the Constitution's appropriations requirement. The
first principle defines the public fisc-the "Treasury" to which the consti-
tutional provision makes reference-as encompassing all funds received by
the United States. The second principle prohibits expenditure from the
public fisc (thus broadly defined) except pursuant to legislative
appropriation.
We have seen that these two foundational constitutional principles are
reflected in legislation: the Miscellaneous Receipts statute and the Anti-
Deficiency Act. Whether particular legislative grants of spending author-
ity comport with the Constitution's appropriations requirement depends
on how faithful Congress itself has been to the norms it has faithfully
articulated in these two framework statutes. Are statutory exceptions to
the Miscellaneous Receipts requirement-statutes delegating authority to
federal agencies to spend collections or donations-best understood as de-
viations from constitutional principles, or simply as unusual applications
of these principles? Are some "appropriations" so open-ended as to defy,
rather than effectuate, the Principle of Appropriations Control?
As shown in Section III-A, the prevailing understanding would treat all
legislative grants of spending authority as "Appropriations" under the
Constitution. Section III-B suggests why this formalistic approach is inad-
equate. Open-ended permission to spend, without further legislative con-
trol, dilutes the Principle of the Public Fisc and the Principle of Appro-
priations Control. Not every creation of spending authority qualifies, ipso
facto, as an "Appropriation[ ] made by Law" under the Constitution.
164. See e.g., IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 391 (referring to testimony of Robert
McFarlane, former National Security Adviser, that accepting gifts of foreign money to fund Nicara-
guan contras "opened the door to expectations of secret return favors").
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A. Legislative Permission as "Appropriation"
When Congress establishes an exception to the general requirement of
the Miscellaneous Receipts statute that any agent of the federal govern-
ment "receiving money for the Government from any source" shall deposit
the money into the Treasury, it usually includes language purporting to
"appropriate" the funds at issue. For instance, the legislation granting the
Secretary of the Treasury discretion to supplement appropriations with
conditional gifts for defense purposes"'5 declares that: "such money is ap-
propriated and shall be available for expenditure for the purposes of the
appropriation to which [it is] paid."1 6 Some revolving fund legislation
uses appropriation language,16 7 and legislative permission to expend fees
and other receipts also often uses the term "appropriation."168 Under pre-
vailing practice, the use of the word "appropriation" is not necessary, as
long as it is clear Congress intends to permit or prescribe expenditure; the
Attorney General has held that legislation creating a revolving fund con-
stitutes permission to spend the receipts of that fund.169
Under this approach, whenever Congress authorizes an agency to re-
ceive and expend gifts, fees, or other payments-in addition to the
165. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying te:t.
166. 50 U.S.C. § 1154 (1982) (emphasis added); see also 22 U.S.C.A. § 2696(d) (West Supp.
1987) (providing that gifts accepted for benefit of State Department, see supra note 130, "are hereby
appropriated"); 31 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982) (providing that "[almounts accruing to these [specified trust]
funds . . . are appropriated to be disbursed in compliance with the terms of the trust").
167. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 756(c) (1982) (monies received by the General Services Administration
General Supply Fund "are reappropriated for the purposes of the fund"); Act of July 9, ch. 143, 40
Stat. 850 (1918) ("[funds received] shall immediately become available for the purposes named in the
original appropriation").
168. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982) (permanent "appropriat[ion]" of certain trust fund
receipts).
169. See, e.g., 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 316, 319-20 (1922) (ICC may spend monies paid by railroads
under Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 422(10), 41 Stat. 456, 490); 51 Comp. Gen. 506 (1972)
(Smithsonian Institution may spend commercial revenues received pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 53 (1982),
see supra note 115).
The understanding that revolving funds are in fact "appropriated" funds is not entirely consistent
with a curious jurisdictional rule of the Court of Claims and successor courts, known as the "non-
appropriated fund" doctrine. Under this doctrine, money claims against self-sustaining government
instrumentalities (e.g., revolving funds) may not be maintained under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
1491-1508 (1982), where the organic legislation creating the instrumentality does not contemplate
appropriations funding. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976). The
basis for the "non-appropriated fund" doctrine apparently is that where Congress provides for an
instrumentality to be self-sustaining, it does not contemplate the United States paying money damages
(under the Tucker Act) in connection with the operations of the instrumentality. Yet if Congress
considers even self-sustaining funds to have been "appropriated" for purposes of the Anti-Deficiency
Act and the Constitution's appropriations clause, then the "non-appropriated" fund doctrine is at best
a misnomer and at worst an unjustifiable limitation on damage claims against the government. See
also United States v. General Elec. Corp., 727 F.2d 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1984); L'Enfant Plaza
Property, Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d 1211, 1212 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (suggesting weak doctrinal basis
of non-appropriated fund doctrine and limiting its application to revolving funds for which "Congress
is [I statutorily prohibited from appropriating funds"). Of course, any such statutory prohibition is of
elusive significance, since Congress can ignore it and appropriate funds anyway. Cf Stith, supra note
61, at 623-25 (strategy of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was to make similar statutory prohibition en-
forceable outside of Congress).
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agency's specific appropriations-the legislative authorization constitutes
what is known as a "permanent"' 0 and "indefinite"1 71 appropriation.
The expenditure of such fees or contributions, supplementing the agency's
annual appropriations, does not violate the Anti-Deficiency Act's prohibi-
tion on spending "exceeding" appropriations 72 because the excess funds
are treated as having been permanently appropriated by the legislation
authorizing the agency to spend them.
There exist permanent or indefinite appropriations for a wide range of
governmental expenditures, quite apart from revolving funds, gifts and
other exceptions to the Miscellaneous Receipts statute. For instance, pay-
ment of interest on the national debt has been permanently and indefi-
nitely appropriated since 1847;171 statutory entitlement programs are gen-
erally funded by permanent appropriations of trust fund or general
Treasury receipts;' 7 ' various contract obligations (for instance, for housing
subsidies) are also paid by permanent, indefinite appropriations."' More-
over, much indefinite or long-term spending authority is enacted outside
the legislative appropriations process-often referred to as "backdoor"
spending.176 In total, over half of the spending authority in the annual
federal budget derives from legislation, including permanent appropria-
tions, enacted by previous Congresses.7
Where Congress creates backdoor spending authority, the significant
legislative act is not the nominal "appropriations" language authorizing
withdrawal from the Treasury. Although Congress nominally may "ap-
propriate" interest payments on the national debt, entitlement benefits,
170. See GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, at 2-5 (1982) (permanent appropriation is "a 'stand-
ing' appropriation, which, once made, is always available for specified purposes and does not require
repeated action by the Congress to authorize its use"). Of course, a "permanent" appropriation is only
as permanent as legislation can be-until Congress repeals or modifies it.
171. Where no maximum amount is stated, an appropriation (whether or not "permanent") is
termed "indefinite," meaning that it is of an unspecified amount. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 43 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinaf-
ter GAO GLOSSARY]. An appropriation may be both permanent and indefinite.
172. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (1982), quoted at supra text accompanying note 140.
173. Act of Feb. 9, 1847, ch. 7, 9 Stat. 123 (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3123 (1982)).
174. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-423 (1982) (Social Security).
175. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1305 (1982) (housing payments). There also is a permanent,
indefinite appropriation for intelligence activities, 50 U.S.C. § 403f(a) (1982), although in practice
intelligence appropriations are subjected to periodic review and limitation, see Halperin v. CIA, 629
F.2d 144, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
176. See GAO GLOSSARY, supra note 171, at 40. The term "backdoor" spending usually encom-
passes, in addition to entitlements, borrowing authority (permission for agency to spend funds bor-
rowed from the public or from the Treasury), contract authority (permission for the agency to enter
contracts in advance of appropriations, as explicitly permitted by the Anti-Deficiency Act), and credit
authority (permission to guarantee or insure loans). See id.; 2 U.S.C. §§ 651(c), 652 (Supp. 1986).
Exceptions to the requirements of the Miscellaneous Receipts statute-collection, revolving fund, and
gift authority-as well as other forms of permanent spending authority are also "backdoor" in the
sense that they provide funding outside of annual appropriations acts. Cf. H. LEONARD, CHECKS
UNBALANCED (1986) (discussing forms of "quiet spending" by government, especially unrecorded
future monetary obligations such as public pensions, loan guarantees, and depreciation).
177. See 1989 BUDGET, supra note 57, at 6 g-17 (showing amounts of budget authority available
without further action by Congress); id. at 6d-2 (similar).
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and contract payments, the fiscally determinative variables are the size of
the federal debt, the eligibility rules and benefit levels of entitlements, and
the amount of contract obligations.1i 8 Congress itself recognizes as much.
In all of these instances, it is fair to say that the actual "appropria-
tions"-whereby Congress formally grants permission to pay out federal
funds from the Treasury-are regarded by Congress as perfunctory, min-
isterial acts.1 79 When Congress decides the substantive contours of the
backdoor spending program, it decides, to a large extent,180 the proper
funding level of the program. Indeed, in the case of statutory entitlement
programs, even where Congress has not provided for a permanent appro-
priation-and instead, formally enacts a new appropriation each
year-internal congressional rules and practice treat such appropriations
as predetermined and mandatory. 81
Thus, the constitutional function of "Appropriations made by Law" is
performed, if at all, at the creation of the backdoor spending program.
Even if Congress imposes no explicit amount or time limitations on back-
door spending authority, it is possible that Congress implicitly performs
its appropriations function. For instance, at the time it enacts an exception
to the general requirement of the Miscellaneous Receipts statute, Con-
gress may be able to predict with a high degree of certainty the expected
size or funding level of the collection or gift account. Even if an accurate
estimate cannot be made, it is possible that creation of collection or gift
authority is a considered legislative judgment that the size of the particu-
lar activity should be dependent upon the success of the activity in the
market or in attracting donors.
Nonetheless, it is doubtful that every creation of permanent, indefinite,
or 'backdoor spending authority performs the function of an "Appropria-
tion[ I made by Law" under the Constitution. The only way to subject
collections, revolving funds, and gifts to full appropriations control would
178. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 803, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1983) (proposing "that permanent
indefinite appropriations be enacted" for certain housing subsidy payments; noting that while
"[n]ormally, an appropriation is the primary means of Congressional control over [] total obligations
... this concept of control is not relevant since the housing payments appropriation represents only
the cash necessary to make payments for contractual obligations previously authorized").
179. These appropriations are often referred to as "liquidating" appropriations. See Stith, supra
note 61, at 606.
180. Even where Congress sets the benefit levels and eligibility criteria for an entitlement pro-
gram, it does not explicitly decide either the maximum or minimum spending level for the program.
For instance, how much money will be spent under a program for federal supplementation of unem-
ployment insurance depends upon the unemployment rate. Additionally, an administering agency may
retain various types of discretion which affect the scope of the program. See Weinstein, Equality and
the Law: Social Security Disability Cases in the Federal Courts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897, 914, 917
(1984).
181. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS. THE CONGRES-
SIONAL BuDGET PRoCESS: A GENERAL EXPLANATION 163-64 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter
BunDET PuocEss]; 1989 BUDGET, supra note 57, at 2b-16 to 2b-19.
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be to require the agency to debit all of these receipts against the amount of
spending authority periodically appropriated by Congress."8 2
In fact, any funding mechanism outside the purview of the legislative
appropriations process... may allow governmental activities to continue
without periodic legislative review and redetermination, and provides pro-
cedural and political protection for future funding,'" which explains why
program advocates seek these forms of funding.I85 Of course, the true
("opportunity") cost of any permanent, indefinite, or backdoor spending
authority is no different from the cost of an annual appropriation. 8 6 But
particularly to the extent a program is self-sustaining-as a revolving
fund or through gifts or other collection authority-Congress may operate
(as a matter of policy or of psychology) under the illusion that funding for
the activity does not affect other budgetary decisions, and that the present
Congress is neither responsible nor accountable for the program.
B. Constitutional Limits on Spending Authority
If an indispensable function of appropriations under the Constitution is
to ensure that Congress has approved the authorized contours of govern-
ment activity, then Congress must clearly define the spending authority it
grants to government agenciesX87 -whether the spending authority is in
the form of an exception to the Miscellaneous Receipts statute, 88 in the
form of entitlements or other conventional "backdoor" spending legisla-
tion, 8 ' in other forms outside the appropriations process,1 90 or in the leg-
182. Congress has generally failed to impose such control on gift authority. See GAO LETTER,
supra note 124; GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, at 5-83; infra note 267. However, Congress does
enact limitations on amount for some types of collection authority. See supra note 113.
183. In addition to backdoor spending authority, see supra note 176, "secret" appropriations for
weapons programs also evade full legislative review and accountability. These programs allegedly
have grown eightfold during the 1980's. See Weiner, A Growing "Black Budget" Pays For Secret
Weapons, Covert Wars, Phil. Inquirer, Feb. 8, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Morrison, Pentagon's Top Secret
"Black" Budget Has Skyrocketed During Reagan Years, NAT'L J., Mar. 1, 1986, at 492; see also
infra notes 201 & 272 and accompanying text.
184. See generally A. WALSH, THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICES OF Gov-
ERNMENT CORPORATIONS (1978); J. BENNETT & T. DILORENZO, UNDERGROUND GOVERNMENT
(1983) (complaining of loss of public control and accountability over self-sustaining public authori-
ties); supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
185. See e.g., Wilson, Broadcasters' Aid Hits Pothole, NAT. J., Dec. 19, 1987, at 3219 (discuss-
ing efforts of national broadcast entities to convince Congress to create new trust fund with permanent
appropriation).
186. For instance, where an offsetting collection is retained for expenditure by the collecting pro-
gram, it is not available for other programs or available to reduce the federal deficit.
187. Cf. National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); FPC v. New
England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974) (construing Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952,
supra note 111, to limit agency's authority to impose fees for government services). But see infra
notes 206-08 and accompanying text (proposed rule does not require reinvigoration of nondelegation
doctrine).
188. For instance, a statute granting an agency gift authority, see supra text accompanying notes
124-34.
189. For instance, borrowing, contract, or credit authority, see supra notes 173-76 and accompa-
nying text.
190. For instance, the permanent appropriations for payment of interest on the national debt, 31
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islative form that Congress actually denominates an "appropriations
act." '191 At the least, Congress' creation of expenditure authority should
always be explicit,192 and Congress should effectively place limits, implic-
itly or explicitly, on the amount and duration of the authority.
This does not mean that Congress may never enact an open-ended "ap-
propriation" of funds. The form of spending authority, by itself, does not
necessarily reveal whether it qualifies as an "Appropriation[ ]" under the
Constitution. Indeed, a particular open-ended mechanism may be intrinsi-
cally related to the nature of the program being funded. 9 For example,
Congress may decide that a particular governmental activity such as postal
delivery should be self-sustaining and that its size should be determined
by market forces. Or Congress may create a trust fund, from dedicated tax
revenues, in order to achieve redistribution of income from particular tax-
payers to particular spending beneficiaries. 194 Spending authority may
likewise be open-ended for statutory entitlements, payment of interest on
the national debt, and liquidation of obligations incurred under borrowing
authority, contract authority, and credit authority. In each of these in-
stances, the form of the actual legislative permission to draw funds from
the Treasury is largely irrelevant, because the government's monetary ob-
ligation is based on previous legislative action. It is the underlying sub-
stantive legislation creating the entitlement or authorizing the executive
branch to incur the obligation that constitutes the ultimate source of
spending authority." 5 Such substantive, backdoor spending enactments
are the real "Appropriations" for constitutional purposes and thus would
be subject to the standards proposed here.
Backdoor spending is consistent with the constitutional norm requiring
Congress to control the public fisc as long as Congress clearly defines the
U.S.C. § 3123 (1982), see supra note 173 and accompanying text, and for intelligence activities, 50
U.S.C. § 403f(a) (1982), see supra note 175.
191. Under present practice, Congress enacts thirteen regular appropriations bills each year; in
four of the last five years, however, all thirteen acts have been enacted in one piece of omnibus
legislation. In addition to covering the administrative expenses of all governmental agencies, the thir-
teen annual appropriations acts include all funding for most discretionary federal expenditure pro-
grams. Congress also enacts "supplemental" appropriations during each fiscal year. See BuDGET
PROCESS, supra note 181, at 10-14, 163.
192. This proposal calls for, in effect, a "clear statement" requirement. Congress has already
imposed such a requirement on direct appropriations from the Treasury. See 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d)
(1982) ("A law may be construed to make an appropriation out of the Treasury . . .only if the law
specifically states that an appropriation is made . . ... ") (emphasis added).
193. Cf. Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 307,
315 (1978) (constitutional nondelegation principle means that Congress must not abdicate its constitu-
tional powers, but congressional delegation is proper if instrumental to legislative policy decision); S.
BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 41 (1975) (Con-
gress may delegate where delegation is proper "instrument of decision" rather than "substitute for
decision.").
194. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-423 (1982 & Supp. 1986) (Social Security trust fund). Other dedi-
cated revenues may match taxpayers and beneficiaries. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-157 (1982) (high-
way trust fund).
195. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
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activity being funded, provides a time limitation on the spending program,
implicitly or explicitly decides the total amount of spending authority, and
undertakes periodic legislative review. Under these conditions, appropria-
tions perform their constitutional function. However, Congress renders
meaningless the Principles of the Public Fisc and of Appropriations Con-
trol if it creates spending authority without amount or time limitations
and fails to subject such authority to periodic legislative review.19
It is especially important that Congress impose amount and time limita-
tions on spending authority in those areas where the Executive19 has sig-
nificant authority to define government policy and has significant discre-
tion in deciding the means of policy implementation. Here the "object"
specifications in appropriations are necessarily broad; thus, the "amount"
and "time" limitations on appropriations are the primary legislative check
upon federal action. In the areas of foreign affairs19 and federal prosecu-
tion,199 it is generally conceded that Congress cannot closely circumscribe
agency powers and the strategies of government policy, much less the par-
ticulars of government action. Those who execute the law in these areas
must exercise significant discretion. In all such areas of significant execu-
196. See supra text accompanying notes 41-55. A time limitation means that spending authority
should not be permanent, but the limitation need not be one fiscal year, as has been the usual practice
when time limitations are imposed, see supra notes 53 & 101. Biennial, triennial, or quintennial
budgeting may effectively assert legislative control over spending, except that appropriations for the
army must be renewed every two years, see supra note 53.
197. I use the term "Executive" to refer to whatever agencies of government have been charged,
by the Constitution and by Congress, with executing the law. Every such "executive" agency need not
be headed by persons removable by the President. See generally Note, In Defense of Administrative
Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787 (1987) (arguing that Constitution permits Congress to create
executive agencies with substantial autonomy).
198. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 444
U.S. 996 (1979). The Constitution's explicit limitation of army appropriations to two years' duration,
art. I, § 8, cl. 12, is evidence that the framers recognized the especially vital role of appropriation
limitations in areas of inherent presidential authority.
199. Recent separation of powers cases have repeatedly asserted that prosecution is a core "execu-
tive" function. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2620-22 (1988); id. at 2626-27 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.
114, 125-26 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974). This characterization is
misleading. The Constitution makes no mention of federal prosecution except indirectly in the Fifth
Amendment's requirement of grand jury indictment. In addition, prosecutors perform many functions
that closely resemble and are related to those of the courts. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. at 2614
n.20, 2620-21. See generally Note, The Proposed Court-Appointed Special Prosecutor: In Quest of a
Constitutional Justification, 87 YALE L.J. 1692, 1692, 1704-11 & n.55 (1978). In any event, there is
no warrant to assume that the exercise of federal prosecutorial authority must be a presidential activ-
ity, as contrasted with the exercise of federal pardon authority, which the Constitution specifically
places in the hands of the President. Indeed, Congress has created several "independent" agencies
with important law enforcement and prosecutorial functions, including the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Nonetheless, as in areas in which the President has inherent authority, federal prosecution is not
generally susceptible to legislative direction or specification of the particulars of government action.
Significant legislative prescription of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion would raise serious due
process concerns. See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 9, cl. 3; Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specifica-
tion: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 347 (1962) ("The bill
of attainder clause. . . is a broad prohibition. . . [which] tells legislatures that they. . . must leave
the job of application [of legislative mandates] to other tribunals.").
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tive discretion rooted in the structure or the values of the Constitution,00
the Executive bears primary responsibility for determining how and
where to assert a federal presence. If Congress creates spending authority
which is open-ended with respect to amount and duration-such as re-
volving funds, gift authority, and other permanent and indefinite appro-
priations, °1 it effectively concedes any role in defining and constraining
executive-that is, governmental-action.02
Where broad executive discretion is inherent in our constitutional
scheme, the most questionable form of spending authority is open-ended
authority to receive and spend donations and gifts. 203 As long as the exec-
utive agency is prepared to accept the donation,0 " Congress loses effective
control over the contours of authorized government activity. Where a do-
nor conditions a gift broadly-for instance, for the defense of the United
States-the recipient federal agency is able to direct the supplemental
funds to activities that might not have garnered congressional approval.
Where the donor specifically conditions the gift-for instance, for defense
in the Persian Gulf-the donor may effectively specify the objects of gov-
ernment expenditure. In either event, where Congress cannot significantly
200. Where executive discretion is traceable not to the terms, structure or values of the Constitu-
tion, but to the efficient performance of a task initiated by Congress (e.g., postal regulation or space
exploration), clear legislative limitation and periodic review of spending authority may not be as con-
stitutionally critical-because Congress also exercises complete constitutional control in defining and
regulating the "object" being funded.
201. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 403f(a)(1982) (permanent, indefinite appropriation for intelligence
activities, see supra note 175). Likewise, the "secret" appropriations for confidential weapons pro-
grams, discussed supra note 183, evade full periodic review by Congress, though they are not perma-
nent and indefinite in form. The Constitution surely permits Congress to arrange its appropriation
processes so as to protect national security, and indeed Congress has done so since the early days of
the nation. See, e.g., Act of July 1, 1790, 1 Stat. 128, 129 (1790); Act of Feb. 9, 1793, 1 Stat. 300,
301, current version codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3526(e) (1982); see also United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 178 n.l (1974); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980). It has been alleged,
however, that in recent years there has been tremendous growth in the "black" military budget with
little or no legislative review. See Weiner, supra note 183; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS 6-7 (1988) (unclassified summary) [hereinafter GAO SPECIAL ACCESS
PROGRAM STUDY] (GAO is unable to determine total amount of secret weapons funding since 1981
or total number of secret weapons programs).
202. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 411-14 (noting loss of legislative control where
Executive resorts to non-government funds for covert activities); see also SENATE SELECT COMM. TO
STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES S. REP. No. 755,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., Book 1, at 205 (1976) ("Church Committee Report") ("It has been feared that
their profits [from private revolving fund operations] were used to provide secret funding for covert
operations, thus avoiding scrutiny by the Executive and the Congress through a 'backdoor' funding
process.").
203. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1154 (1982) (gifts for defense purposes); 22 U.S.C. § 2455(0
(1982) (contributions received by the United States Information Agency); 22 U.S.C.A. § 2697 (West
Supp. 1988) (gifts for the benefit of the State Department). After allegations of misuse of certain
contributions, see supra note 163, the State Department's gift authority was amended in 1987 to
prohibit expenditures "for representational purposes at United States missions except in accordance
with the conditions that apply to appropriated funds." Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §
125, 101 Stat. 1331, 1341 (amending 22 U.S.C. § 2697(b)); see also supra note 164.
204. It seems elementary that government officials, when offered an opportunity to increase their
budgetary resources, can be expected usually accept the offer. See generally BUDGETS AND BUREAU-
CRATS: THE SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH (T. Borcherding ed. 1977).
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circumscribe an agency's purposes and powers, to allow the agency to
spend all contributions would be to permit private power, subject only to
executive discretion, 20 5 to influence the contours of government and gov-
ernment policy.208 In areas of significant executive authority, the receipt
and expenditure of money that is not deposited into "the Treasury" and
drawn therefrom according to criteria set forth in legislation is especially
incompatible with constitutional principles.
The norms proposed here imply neither reinvigoration of the "nondele-
gation doctrine, ' '2°7 nor specific, "line-item" appropriations legislation.208
The constitutional prerequisites for government action do not require de-
tailed legislative direction regarding every executive expenditure and ac-
tion.2 °0 Nor does the Constitution prohibit Congress from ever relying on
205. The executive check may be especially inadequate in sensitive areas of inherent executive
authority because ordinary bureaucratic control procedures within the executive branch may be lack-
ing. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 117-53; supra note 163 (concerning possible mis-
use of gift funds in State Department); supra note 202 (quoting from Church Committee Report);
Weiner, supra note 183 (" 'black budget' may be far more vulnerable than the rest of the defense
budget to shoddy work, inflated bills and outright fraud by contractors"); GAO SPECIAL ACCESS
PROGRAM STUDY, supra note 201, at 7-9 (concluding that Pentagon's oversight procedures are
inadequate).
206. Of course, if all contributions to the government are subjected to appropriations control, this
might simply result in potential donors making contributions directly to nongovernmental entities en-
gaged in the target activity. This result is constitutionally permissible, as long as the contributions are
in fact made to nongovernmental entities and are not spent in the name of the United States. See also
supra text accompanying notes 88-96 (government agents may not solicit contributions for nongovern-
mental activity where all appropriations are denied). The Principles of the Public Fisc and of Appro-
priations Control have limits; they apply, by definition, only to monies belonging to the United States
and to expenditures in the name of the United States. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70. If
Congress wishes to regulate private spending of private funds, it has means of doing so-for instance,
its regulation of foreign trade and its indirect circumscription of private spending through tax exemp-
tions and preferences.
207. Judicial enforcement of a broad nondelegation principle, see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), has been long dormant, though there has been occasional judicial refer-
ence to the concept. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000 n.1 (1979) (plurality opinion);
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-44 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974). For scholarly commen-
tary proposing its revival, see S. BARBER, supra note 193, at 36-51; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 133-34 (1980); Gewirtz, supra note 25, at 49-65; McGowan, Congress, Courts and Con-
trol of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119 (1977); see also Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 86 (1986) (urging greater judicial scrutiny of legislative
process in order to promote neo-Madisonian values); T. Low, THE END OF LIBERALISM 97-126 (2d
ed. 1979) (analyzing growth of regulatory authority in twentieth century).
208. In previous eras, this type of legislation was a common, if not fully effective, way in which
the Congress regulated executive expenditure. See generally Stith, supra note 61, at 609-12; L.
FISHER, supra note 4, at 36-38, 59.
209. The argument presented here is consistent with broad legislative delegation (or definition) of
agency powers and authorized "objects." See also Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1. J. LAW, ECON. & ORGAN. 81, 86-87, 95-99 (1985) (arguing that
far from diluting accountability, delegation to administrative agencies enhances accountability). The
norms proposed here relate only to legislative grants of spending authority, not to the creation or
regulation of executive agency powers. Indeed, this argument is fully compatible with broad delega-
tions to executive agencies not only where constitutionally required, but also in areas where Congress
has plenary regulatory power. Moreover, the proposed general requirements of clear statement and
explicit or implicit time and amount limitation are not the sorts of issues that Congress is less well
equipped to address than administrators. Most importantly, unlike the general "nondelegation" doc-
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volunteers or gifts, or from ever letting the executive branch or the market
determine the quantity of a government service. But the foundational con-
stitutional decisions to create a limited federal government210 and to em-
power Congress to regulate the activities of the government, especially by
requiring legislative appropriations,2" do ordain that Congress should not
lightly accede to effective executive control over the size, scope, and char-
acter of federal action. Where Congress fails to provide a clear statement
of the activity or object being funded and fails to impose effective limita-
tions on the amount and the duration of the appropriation, it has abdi-
cated one of its principal constitutional responsibilities.
IV. ENFORCING THE APPROPRIATIONS REQUIREMENT
The previous Sections have proposed that the appropriations require-
ment is a prescription directed to Congress as well as a limitation on the
Executive. The Executive violates the Principle of Appropriations Control
and the Principle of the Public Fisc if it spends funds not appropriated by
Congress. Congress may transgress the constitutional norm if it legislates
permanent or other open-ended spending authority, particularly in areas
where the executive branch has significant discretion in defining the ob-
jects of expenditure.
The question thus arises how the Principles of the Public Fisc and of
Appropriations Control may be enforced, against the executive branch
and, when appropriate, against Congress. As explained in this concluding
Section, the courts cannot be expected to bear all, or even most, of this
enforcement responsibility. Rather, Congress itself must identify institu-
tions and procedures to vindicate its constitutional power of the purse.
A. Enforcement Against the Executive
It is true, of course, that the Constitution places responsibility for ap-
propriations in the legislative branch, 12 but it sometimes falls to the
courts to play a role in implementing the constitutional requirement by
enforcing against the Executive the limitations that Congress has placed
on spending authority. If Congress specifies that only a certain sum may
be spent on a certain item, or that no funds may be spent on some other
item, the courts may be available to determine authoritatively whether the
trine, judicial enforcement is not necessarily contemplated. See infra text accompanying notes 248-58.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 9-19.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33.
212. See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 290-91 (1850); Hart's Case, 16 Ct. Cl. 459,
484 (1881) ("[A]bsolute control of money of the United States is in Congress, and Congress is respon-
sible for its exercise of this great power only to the people."), affd, 118 U.S. 62 (1886); cf. Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) ("textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department .... ").
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operating branch of government has complied with the specified
limitations. 3
Often, however, when faced with an issue of executive compliance with
appropriations limitations, courts have declined to decide cases on the
merits,2 14 particularly in areas where the Executive's constitutional pow-
ers are significant.2 15 Even where private parties have an interest or in-
centive to sue to enforce compliance with spending limitations, 1 ' they
may be held not to have "standing" to bring suit.21 7 Conversely, where
private parties would have standing to challenge executive compliance
with most federal appropriation limitations, 1 ' they may choose not to do
213. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1977) (holding that appropriations for TVA were
subject to limitations in Endangered Species Act); UAW v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 859-63 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (holding that appropriations legislation gave Secretary of Labor discretion to allocate
lump-sum appropriation among various training programs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985); Rami-
rez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding "adjudi-
cable" a claim that Executive usurped Congress' constitutionally granted powers of law-making and
appropriation by operating camp in Honduras for training Salvadoran soldiers), vacated and re-
manded, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) (for reconsideration in light of subsequent appropriations legislation
and withdrawal of U.S. military from plaintiff's land); City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that Secretary of Transportation had not fully complied with appropria-
tions limitations).
214. See, e.g., Phelps v. Reagan, 812 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1987) (taxpayer lacks standing to
challenge use of appropriated funds for appointment of ambassador to Vatican); Dickson v. Ford, 521
F.2d 234 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (taxpayer lacks standing to challenge President's power under
Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973 to spend appropriated monies in support of Israel), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1975).
215. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-03 (1979) (plurality opinion); see also Holtz-
man v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding, inter alia, that challenge to Vietnam War
is not justiciable), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Americans United for Separation of Church and
State v. Reagan, 786 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.) (extension of diplomatic relations to Vatican not subject to
judicial review), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 314 (1986); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (challenge by member of Congress to military assistance to El Salvador is nonjusticiable), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
216. Recipients of federal funds do not necessarily have an incentive to challenge the Executive's
failure to comply with appropriations limitations on those funds. Hence many suits challenging the
constitutionality or legality of federal expenditure programs have been brought by competitors of re-
cipients, by persons claiming that they too should have received funds, by persons claiming "taxpayer
standing," by persons claiming indirect harm as a result of the federal program, or by members of
Congress opposed to the program. See supra note 215; infra notes 218, 251-52.
217. In order to have standing in an article III court, a plaintiff must be able to show injury-in-
fact that is a result of the contested action and that is judicially redressable. Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); see, e.g.,
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1971) (environmental suit in which plaintiff's interests were
found too general, attenuated, or vague to confer standing); International Primate Protection League
v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986) (similar), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1624 (1987); Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985) (similar); Animal Lovers Volunteers
Ass'n v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985) (similar); see also infra note 256.
218. There are various circumstances in which persons and entities injured by federal spending
programs may have standing to challenge the legality of particular expenditures by the Executive. See,
e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1515-20 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(United States citizen who owns land in Honduras has standing to challenge United States govern-
ment's use of his property for training camp), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 471 U.S.
1113 (1985); B.K. Instruments Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1983) (disappointed
bidders have standing to challenge federal contract bids); Spencer, White, & Prentis, Inc. v. EPA, 641
F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); Hayes Int'l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247 (5th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (same); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978);
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so. Moreover, judicial enforcement may not be the most efficient or effec-
tive way of ensuring compliance with legislative conditions in federal
spending programs.
Even where courts may not be available to construe and enforce appro-
priations limitations, constitutional theory regarding legislative appropria-
tions is not a mere academic exercise. Congress and the executive branch
order their affairs and assert their claims to competence based upon their
understanding of evolving constitutional norms. In particular, the Attor-
ney General from time to time renders formal opinions219 interpreting ap-
propriations limitations or analyzing the constitutional spending preroga-
tives of the President.210 These opinions have not simply or invariably
supported the claims of the Executive; they have at times rejected agency
claims of authority and resolved competing claims of authority.221 Except
for the Comptroller General, federal officers have been reluctant to chal-
lenge Attorney General opinions.22' Though Attorney General opinions
do not have the effect or authority of judicial decisions, "[p]ractice makes
it clear that they are considered to be much more than merely advisory
and, as a consequence, they are of great practical force in providing rules
of operation for administrative officers."2 The opinions have played a
critical role in developing the law in areas commonly addressed by
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Oregon
Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1987); Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Costle,
646 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
219. See supra note 145.
220. For instance, in the five volumes of Department of Justice opinions issued between 1977 and
1981, see supra note 145, there were 27 opinions directly pertaining to the legality of proposed ex-
penditures. See 1-4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel (1977-1981).
221. See, e.g., 15 Op. Att'y Gen. 209 (1877) (denying executive authority to supply army with
private funds where Congress has failed to appropriate funds); 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 16 (1980)
(Federal Trade Commission must shut down where Congress has failed to enact timely appropria-
tion); 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1 (1981) (where Congress has failed to enact appropriations prior to
start of new fiscal year, most but not all operations of affected agencies must cease); Office of Legal
Counsel, Memorandum Re Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to
Federally Impacted Schools (Dec. 1, 1969), quoted in J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 284 (1983) (memorandum of then-Assistant Attorney General Rehn-
quist concluding there is no inherent presidential authority to impound funds).
An especially interesting recent opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel concerned the constitutional-
ity of an appropriation limitation (the so-called "Baxter Amendment") that sought to prevent the
Department of Justice, through Assistant Attorney General Baxter, from making a particular anti-
trust argument before the Supreme Court in a case in which the Department had already filed a brief
making that argument. The Office of Legal Counsel refrained from asserting that this limitation was
unconstitutional, though it hinted that the limitation could violate the President's duty to "execute"
the law. Memorandum for William F. Baxter (Dec. 2, 1983) (copy on file with author).
222. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 74 (2d ed. 1973); H. MANSFIELD, THE COMPTROL-
LER GENERAL 104 (1939) (Comptroller General "treated opinions of the Attorney General as a court
does the precedents of a foreign jurisdiction; to be cited if he agreed with them, to be distinguished or
disregarded if he did not"); see also infra text accompanying note 235.
223. Nealon, The Opinion Function of the Federal Attorney General, 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 825,
842 (1950); see also Rhodes, "Opinions of the Attorney General" Revived, 64 A.B.A.J. 1374, 1375
(1978).
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courts,224 as well as in circumstances where the controversy is
nonjusticiable. 25
Application and enforcement of the law governing appropriations is
also a concern of the Comptroller General, who has an important advisory
role in reviewing executive compliance with appropriations limitations
and the lawfulness of proposed expenditures. The Comptroller General is
uniquely independent from both the Executive and the leadership of Con-
gress.2 26 Until the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established the
General Accounting Office (GAO), headed by the Comptroller Gen-
eral,227 Congress had relied principally on the Department of the Trea-
sury to review agency compliance with legislative appropriations limita-
tions. From its inception in 1789,228 the Treasury Department, unlike
other executive agencies, had been invested with several special responsi-
bilities to Congress.2 29 The duties of special offices within the Treasury
included independent audits of government programs and the exercise of
independent judgment in disbursing or withholding funds.23 0 However, by
the early 20th century, it was apparent that the removal power of the
224. See H. CUMMINGS & C. MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 90 (1937); Nealon, supra note
223, at 834-47; P. BATOR et al., supra note 222, at 70-74.
225. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (dismissing State of Hawaii's suit
against United States because government had not consented to suit; opinion notes Attorney General's
opinion on merits of suit).
226. The original 1921 legislation provided that the Comptroller General would be appointed by
the President subject to confirmation by the Senate. In 1980, the appointment provision was amended
to provide that the President must appoint a Comptroller General from a list of three persons pro-
vided by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate; Senate confirmation
is still required. 31 U.S.C. § 703(a)(I)-(3) (1982). The Comptroller General can be removed only by
impeachment or "for cause" by joint resolution. Id. § 703(e)(1) (1982).
In Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986), the Supreme Court characterized the Comptroller
General as an official in the "legislative branch" because he is removable by legislation. Id. at 3191.
At least as a matter of practice, however, the Comptroller General has enjoyed significant indepen-
dence. See id. at 3123 (White, J., dissenting) ("The practical result of the removal provision is not to
render the Comptroller unduly dependent upon or subservient to Congress, but to render him one of
the most independent officers in the entire federal establishment."); id. at 3216 n.1 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("The Comptroller General is not Congress, nor is he a part of Congress; 'irrespective of
Congress' designation,' he is an officer of the United States, appointed by the President." (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 128 n.165 (1976) (per curiam)); see also F. MOSHER, supra note 79, at
158 ("All of the comptrollers general have treasured and defended the independence of their office,
not alone from the President but also from Congress itself.").
227. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 31 U.S.C.).
228. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65.
229. For instance, the statute creating the Treasury Department required the Secretary to re-
spond to all congressional inquiries and to apprise Congress of his activities. See id. at 65-66. As one
scholar has noted, "In contrast, the First Congress had placed a statutory injunction of obedience on
the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs [Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 28] and War [Act of Aug.
7, 1789, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 49] to 'perform and execute such duties as shall be enjoined or entrusted to
[them] by the President of the United States.' It laid no such injunction of obedience upon the Secre-
tary of the Treasury." Tiefer, supra note 37, at 72 (quoting Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat.
28).
230. See Tiefer, supra note 37, at 70-76 and sources cited therein. The primary official in the
Treasury charged with fiscal control was the Comptroller, "the great-grandparent of the modern
Comptroller General." F. MOSHER, THE GAO: THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 25 (1979).
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President curtailed the effectiveness of these special Treasury offices in
monitoring executive compliance with appropriations limitations." 1
By transferring the federal auditing functions to an independent officer
not answerable to the President and removable by legislation only for
"cause, '' 2 Congress sought better to ensure executive compliance with
spending legislation.2"' The Comptroller General is empowered to review
executive records and to exercise independent judgment in allowing or dis-
allowing payment.2 In exercising his authority to review federal spend-
ing, the Comptroller General performs quasi-executive and quasi-judicial
functions by disapproving of payments which, under his interpretation of
spending laws, are not authorized. 3 5 It is not clear whether Congress has
intended that the Comptroller General's determinations bind the executive
branch,23 6 but in any event a GAO determination that proposed spending
is not authorized may convince the executive branch to alter its spending
plans.237 While the judicial branch is not bound by GAO determinations
as to the legality of executive spending,'" these determinations have been
accorded significant deference by the courts.23 9
Despite its considerable authority, the GAO does not at present ensure
231. See id. at 48-51 (explaining impetus for creation of General Accounting Office).
232. 31 U.S.C § 703(e)(1) (1982); see also supra note 226.
233. See Morgan, The General Accounting Office: One Hope for Congress to Regain Parity of
Power with the President, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1279, 1280-81 (1973).
234. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 716-717 (1982) (GAO authority to investigate and analyze expendi-
tures of public funds); 31 U.S.C. § 3523(a) (1982) ("Except as specifically provided by law, the
Comptroller General shall audit the financial transactions of each agency."); 31 U.S.C. § 3526(a)
(1982) ("The Comptroller General shall settle all accounts of the United States Government and
supervise the recovery of all debts finally certified by the Comptroller General as due the Govern-
ment."); 31 U.S.C. § 3702(a) (1982) ("Except as provided . . . the Comptroller General shall settle
all claims of or against the United States Government.").
235. In addition to after-the-fact audit or review, the Comptroller General may issue advance
opinions on the legality of proposed expenditures. See, e.g., Matter of Customs Serv. Reimbursement
for Additional Personnel at Miami Int'l Airport, 59 Comp. Gen. 294 (1980) (concluding that Cus-
toms Service has no authority to receive contributions from Miami area businesses to supplement slow
and inadequate U.S. Customs services).
236. Compare United States ex rel. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1927),
and United States v. Standard Oil Co., 545 F.2d 624, 637-38 (9th Cir. 1976) with S & E Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1972) (Douglas, J.).
In the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Congress provided that the Comptroller General's
certification of appropriations balances would be binding on the executive branch. Budget and Ac-
counting Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 304, 42 Stat. 20, 24. The present codification provides that "On
settling an account of the Government, the balance certified by the Comptroller General is conclusive
on the executive branch ...."). 31 U.S.C. § 3526(d) (1982). It is by no means clear, however, that
Congress intends the Comptroller General to have pre-audit certification authority. See generally F.
MOSHER, supra note 230, at 209-14, 240-41.
In recently granting the Comptroller General authority to review the legality of government con-
tract awards, Congress provided only that the Comptroller General could "recommend" agency ac-
tion. 31 U.S.C. § 3554(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
237. See F. MOSHER, supra note 230, at 298-304; Morgan, supra note 233, at 1291-95.
238. See United States ex rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F.2d 94 (D.D.C. 1964);
GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, at 1-3 to 1-4; Morgan, supra note 233, at 1300-03.
239. See, e.g., Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United
States ex rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94, 99-100 (D.D.C. 1964). But see also
Intercity Broadcasting v. Cardenas, 554 F. Supp. 42, 47-52 (D.D.C. 1982).
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or even seek to ensure executive compliance with all spending legislation.
Its audit duties and capabilities are not comprehensive, and some federal
agencies are outside its purview.240 Moreover, the constitutionality of stat-
utes authorizing the GAO to sue to enforce the Impoundment Control
Act,241 to subpoena agency files and to enforce these subpoenas in court,2 42
and to stay award of a government contract following a protest to the
Comptroller General24 has been called into question by the Supreme
Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar.244 In Synar, the court held that the
Comptroller General is a "legislative" officer and thus may not have a
role in enforcing the law.
Until Congress resolves the constitutional status of the GAO2 45 and de-
cides what role that agency should play in ensuring compliance with ap-
propriations legislation, Congress cannot hope to develop a coherent strat-
egy for implementing the constitutional principles governing
240. See F. MOSHER, supra note 230, at 298 (GAO audits each agency on "an infrequent spot-
check basis"); F. MOSHER, supra note 79, at 153-62 (discussing shift in GAO activities since 1950);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1984 app. I (GAO conducted fewer
than 700 audits during 1984).
241. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, § 1016, 2 U.S.C. § 687
(1982) (amended 1984 and 1987). The Impoundment Control Act as a whole, 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-687
(1982 & West Supp. 1987), is a significant congressional effort to implement the Principle of Appro-
priations Control. The Act addresses the question whether the Executive may ever not spend funds
which Congress has appropriated. The legislation answers that question by providing that Congress
must approve proposed impoundments. See New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 902-04, 906-
08 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, § 206(a), 101 Stat. 754, 785 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 684 to delete provi-
sion for one-House veto of certain impoundments).
242. General Accounting Office Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-226, § 102, 94 Stat. 312 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 716(b) (1982)).
243. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2741(a) in part, 98 Stat.
494, 1200-01 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
244. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
245. Compare Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 885 (3d Cir.
1986) (pre-Synar holding that Comptroller General is not in legislative branch) with Ameron, Inc. v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986) (post-Synar affirmance, holding
that "de minimis" separation of powers violation may be ignored), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1218
(1988). See generally Note, The Role of the Comptroller General in Light of Bowsher v. Synar, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1539 (1987). See also Note, supra note 197, at 811 & n.154 (questioning constitu-
tionality of Competition in Contracting Act in light of Synar).
Even before Synar, the Department of Justice challenged the constitutionality of these statutes. See
Staats v. Lynn, No. 75-0551 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 15, 1975), discussed in Williamson, The GAO Goes
to Court: The Impoundment Case, GAO REV., Spring 1976, at 55, 63 (noting that Lynn, only case in
which GAO ever sued to enforce Impoundment Control Act prohibitions, was dismissed after im-
pounded funds were released); H.R. REP. No. 425, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979) (noting argument of
Department of Justice that provisions of General Accounting Office Act of 1980 permitting judicial
enforcement of information requests are unconstitutional "because that would constitute 'execution of
the law' which neither the Congress nor the GAO as legislative bodies have the authority to per-
form"); President's Statement on signing H.R. 4170 into law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1037
(July 18, 1984) (asserting that bid protest provisions of Competition in Contracting Act "would un-
constitutionally attempt to delegate to the Comptroller General of the United States, an officer of
Congress, the power to perform duties and responsibilities that in our constitutional system may be
performed only by officials of the executive branch"). Compare OMB Bulletin No. 85-8 (Dec. 17,
1984) (directing heads of executive departments to disregard GAO claim of power to stay contracts
under Competition in Contracting Act) with Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C.L. REV.
381 (1986) (arguing that OMB directive is willful disobedience of law).
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appropriations. Congress must decide whether the GAO's duties, in addi-
tion to investigating, reviewing, and reporting to Congress, 246 should in-
clude rendering either advisory or binding opinions to executive agencies,
or bringing suits against the Executive. If Comptroller General determi-
nations are to be binding on executive agencies, or if the Comptroller
General is empowered to obtain judicial enforcement of appropriations
limitations, Congress must, it appears, at least repeal the provision per-
mitting legislative removal of the Comptroller General for cause.247
B. Enforcement Against Congress
There has been no judicial enforcement of the Constitution's appropria-
tions requirement against Congress itself. If, as the Supreme Court indi-
cated a century ago, Congress has "absolute" authority to construe and to
effectuate the appropriations requirement,248 then a judicial challenge to
the constitutional adequacy of legislation granting spending authority is
doomed; every such enactment would be, by definition, a constitutional
"appropriation."2 4 In United States v. Richardson, a case involving ap-
propriations for the CIA,2"' the Supreme Court asserted that Congress
has "plenary" authority in implementing the companion "Statement and
Account" clause.25' Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit relied on Richardson in dismissing for lack of standing
another challenge involving CIA appropriations.252 In the course of its
opinion, the court suggested that Congress has "plenary" authority to in-
terpret all of article I, section 9, clause 7, including the appropriations
clause, and that the courts therefore have no power to consider the consti-
tutional adequacy of spending legislation. 3
Clearly the courts are not well situated to decide precisely how the ap-
propriations requirement should be implemented-for instance, what role
246. See also infra note 268 and accompanying text (role of GAO in helping Congress itself abide
by appropriations requirement).
247. See supra note 232.
248. See cases cites supra note 212.
249. If Congress has plenary power to interpret a constitutional command, the command means
only what Congress says it means. Cf Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981) (double
jeopardy clause does not'restrain legislative imposition of dual penalties; "the question of what pun-
ishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the
Legislative Branch intended to be imposed."); see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (opin-
ion of Rehnquist, J.); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (employing similar reasoning with re-
spect to property and liberty interests under due process clause).
250. See supra note 175.
251. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.1l (1974) (5-4) ("It is clear that Congress
has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public
interest.").
252. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (congressman's challenge to CIA alleg-
edly using its secret appropriations for unauthorized activities).
253. Id. at 194 n.7 (relying on Hart's Case, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1881), affd, 118 U.S. 62
(1886); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 178 n.11); see also Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144,
154-62 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that statement and account clause does not create judicially enforce-
able standard for disclosure of intelligence expenditures).
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executive agencies should have in development of the budget, how specific
appropriations should be, and what forms spending authority should
take.' " On the other hand, courts would appear to have both the capacity
and the power to enforce the appropriation norms proposed here-that
Congress provide a clear statement of object and that it limit the amount
and duration of spending authority. 55 Nonetheless, courts may invoke
prudential justiciability doctrines, such as "standing" requirements256 and
the political question doctrine,257 to avoid consideration of the constitu-
tional adequacy of appropriations legislation. There are strong prudential
considerations for abstaining from addressing the adequacy of appropria-
tions legislation absent conflict between the President and Congress.2 58
That courts may not have occasion in the near future to address the
constitutional responsibilities of Congress under the appropriations clause
does not mean that the issue may or should be ignored. The constitutional
norms worthy of the attention of scholars and decisionmakers are not lim-
ited to those that might be articulated and enforced by the courts. 59
254. For an examination of how Congress has filled in these interstices of the appropriations
clause, see Stith, supra note 61.
255. The constitutional grant of the appropriations power to Congress need not imply that Con-
gress has sole power to interpret the appropriations clause. Congress does not have sole power to
interpret the enumerated powers of article I, section 8, or other limitations on Congress in article I,
section 9. See supra note 28; cf. Powell v..McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-48 (1969) (limits on
Congress' power to construe and implement article I, section 5).
256. The requirements of the "standing" doctrine, see supra note 217, may not be met because
there may not be an adequate judicial remedy for Congress' failure to exercise its control over the
purse. Cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to.Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974) ("citizenship"
alone does not confer standing, absent concrete injury); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
174-80 (1974) (taxpayer has no standing to challenge implementation of statement and account
clause). Akhil Amar has argued that the entire doctrine of "standing" is based on misconceptions
about the constitutional function of courts. See Amar, supra note 122.
257. The political question doctrine, which the Supreme Court first articulated thoroughly in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), has been distilled to three inquiries: "(i) Does the issue
involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of
Government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial
expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?" Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).
258. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) ("The Judi-
cial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and
Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse."); see also Elliott, Regulating the
Deficit after Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. oN REG. 317, 332-36 (1987) (arguing that case was not
"ripe" because Congress and the President were not in conflict); Note, The Balanced Budget Amend-
ment: An Inquiry Into Appropriateness, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1600, 1612-19 (1983) (although neither
standing nor political question doctrines prevent courts from hearing cases alleging violations of pro-
posed balanced budget amendment, judicial enforcement of amendment would be disastrous); Bork,
Would a Budget Amendment Work?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1979, at 20, col. 4 (similar).
259. See Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (Holmes, J.) ("it must be
remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite
as great a degree as the courts"); cf Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Consti-
tutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (arguing that constitutional norms are valued to
their full conceptual limits independent of the extent of judicial enforcement); Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 106, 175-77 (1976) (nonjudicial institutions may
interpret demands of Constitution differently and more broadly than do courts); Brest, A Conscien-
tious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 585, 587 (1975) (Con-
gress should give "great weight to" judicial interpretation of Constitution); Linde, Judges, Critics,
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If these questions are indeed nonjusticiable, it is all the more important
that the political branches fully articulate, in legislation, the constitutional
norms applicable to Congress' exercise of the power of the purse. More-
over, Congress can and should develop additional institutional mecha-
nisms to aid it in abiding by these norms in its spending legislation. The
constitutional norms proposed in this Article-that legislative appropria-
tions encompass a clear statement of object and be limited in amount and
duration-provide a rule, a standard of injury, and a standard of remedy
that are at least legislatively cognizable.
In fact, the most recent enactments governing the legislative budget pro-
cess itself-the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 20 and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislationa' 1-reflect an un-
derstanding of the place of legislative appropriations in our constitutional
order that is congruent with that proposed here: that appropriations con-
trol is both a critical constitutional limitation on the Executive and a con-
stitutional duty of Congress. 2 2 Pursuant to these recent enactments, the
Congressional Budget Office provides an estimate of the budgetary costs of
all proposed legislation granting spending authority,263 even in bills not
denominated "appropriations acts" and even where the spending authority
takes the form of an exception to the requirements of the Miscellaneous
Receipts statute.2 ' Under procedures devised in the 1974 Budget Act,
amount and time limitations have been routinely enacted for some types of
and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972) (criticizing idea that law is only what the judges
say it is); see also Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 23 (1986) (noting
importance of "citizen participation in constitutional discourse and decisionmaking"); CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONTROVERSIES, supra note 5, at 95-96 (Rep. Panetta, discussing congressional budget pro-
cedures: "Ultimately, we have to be held accountable to the public. The public has to say whether we
did or we didn't do our job as the Constitution intended.").
260. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 31
& 42 U.S.C.).
261. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1037, amended by Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-199, 101 Stat. 754 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 31 & 42
U.S.C.).
262. See also CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES, supra note 5, at 95-96 (Rep. Panetta sug-
gesting that various types of backdoor spending "avoid the accountability that is the heart and soul of
our democratic system").
It has been suggested that the creation of sequestration authority under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
represents a movement away from legislative accountability because it delegates Congress' appropria-
tions power. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100,
230 n.82 (1986). In fact, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is an attempt to assert greater legislative control
over the purse, and it limits the President's allocational authority (in the event of a sequestration)
more so than does conventional appropriations legislation. See Stith, supra note 61, at 643-50; see
also id. at 660-61 & n.370 (explaining why Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is consistent with Congress'
special obligations under the appropriations clause).
263. See generally A. SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY 131-65 (1980) (review of origins, struc-
ture, and functions of Congressional Budget Office prior to new duties imposed by Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings).
264. Indeed, the 1974 Budget Act even requires that the President's budget submission to Con-
gress include a "tax expenditure" budget. 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16)(1982). This list, however, is only
informational; Congress does not appropriate tax expenditures. See also supra text accompanying
notes 74-77.
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collection authority,265 and it is now procedurally difficult to establish new
revolving funds. Other forms of backdoor spending authority, including
new entitlement programs, have been subjected to much closer legislative
scrutiny and control.266
Congress could do more. It could subject new gift authority to the same
legislative scrutiny and control to which it now subjects other forms of
permanent backdoor spending authority. 6 7 It could encourage or require
the GAO to undertake a greater role in reviewing and proposing limita-
tions on permanent and other open-ended authority."6 ' It also could more
fully implement the companion clause to the appropriations clause in the
Constitution-the "Statement and Account" clause.26 9 Neither presiden-
tial nor congressional budget documents set forth in a unified, easily as-
certainable manner the amount of gifts, revolving fund receipts, or collec-
tions credited directly to appropriation accounts.2 70 Nor does the federal
budget reveal the long-term cost of new backdoor spending programs. In
view of the constitutional importance of periodic legislative review and
renewal of spending authority, Congress should be provided with com-
plete information regarding obligations incurred under open-ended grants
of spending authority. Finally, pursuant to the power of each House of
Congress to determine its internal rules of procedure,2 71 Congress could
impose greater procedural limitations on all varieties of permanent, indefi-
nite or other automatic spending authority. 272 While procedural limita-
265. See 1989 BUDGET, supra note 57, at 6e-15 ("it is not unusual for the Congress to enact
limitations on the obligations that can be financed by these [collections credited to appropriation or
fund accounts]").
266. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-652 (West Supp. 1987). A summary of the changes wrought by the
1974 Budget Act and the original Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation is presented in BUDGET PRO-
cEss, supra note 181.
267. The 1974 Budget Act specifically exempts gift authority from its major procedural limita-
tions on new backdoor spending. See 2 U.S.C. § 651(d)(3)(B)(1982).
268. The GAO already has authority to conduct such reviews and periodically does issue analyses
noting the gaps in legislative appropriations control. See, e.g., GAO Letter, supra note 124; CoMP-
TROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, FUNDING GAPS
JEOPARDIZE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (1981); Letter from Comptroller General to Chairman,
U.S. House Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 11, 1984) (concerning executive compliance with first
"Boland Amendment" restricting aid to Nicaraguan contras) (copy on file with author). Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings directs the GAO to undertake a long-term study of all permanent appropriations
and backdoor spending. Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 214, 99 Stat. 1037, 1059 (1985) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §
654 (Supp. 1986)).
269. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
270. See 1989 BUDGET, supra note 57, app. pts. I & IV; S. Doc. No. 21 , 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) ("Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc."); supra notes 121 & 124.
271. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
272. The 1974 Budget Act, as amended by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, requires Congress to con-
sider all revenue and spending measures in relation to each other, makes creation of most new perma-
nent funding mechanisms procedurally difficult, subjects most spending authority outside of appropri-
ation acts to annual legislative control ("reconciliation"), creates new procedural requirements for
consideration of all spending and revenue legislation, and imposes an overall deficit limitation on the
federal budget. However, there remain procedural mechanisms to avoid these requirements. See, e.g.,
supra note 267. See generally BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 181; Stith, supra note 61, Parts II &
IV.
Congress also has declined to establish, by statute or formal internal rule of each House, appropria-
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tions on backdoor spending are enforceable only at the pleasure of each
House, tough and clear rules disfavoring such spending mechanisms
would underscore Congress' own commitment to meeting its appropria-
tions obligations under the Constitution.
Although there is more to do, it is significant that the framework stat-
utes governing federal spending themselves embody the principles implicit
in the Constitution's appropriations requirement. The Miscellaneous Re-
ceipts statute 7 ' and the Anti-Deficiency Act27 articulate, respectively, the
Principle of the Public Fisc and the Principle of Appropriations Control,
and thus hold that the Executive may not expend funds in the name of the
United States except as appropriated by Congress. In other framework
legislation, Congress has recognized its own, on-going obligation to limit
the amount and duration of spending authority. Indeed, much of the his-
tory of Congress' implementation of the appropriations clause, from the
earliest framework statutes27 5 to the 1974 Budget Act and Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, has consisted of efforts to assert legislative control over
government spending.2 78 Unfortunately, these efforts have not always been
thorough and consistent. Control of government expenditures is among
Congress' most important and immutable rights. It is also among Con-
gress' indispensable duties.
tions control procedures for the growing "black" budget, see supra notes 183 & 201. See generally
Maroni, Special Access Programs and the Defense Budget: Understanding the "Black Budget"
(Congressional Research Service, Feb. 10, 1988). In 1987, Congress enacted legislation that may in-
crease legislative oversight of secret weapons programs. National Defense Authorization Act, fiscal
years 1988 & 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, §§ 1131-1133, 101 Stat. 1019, 1150-1153 (to be codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 119).
273. See supra notes 105-35 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 136-64 and accompanying text.
275. The statement of Congressman John Randolph quoted in the title margin of this Article,
recognizing both Congress' appropriations power and its appropriations "duty," was made as Con-
gress was considering the Act of Mar. 3, 1809, 2 Stat. 535. This is the statute that I have identified as
one of the earliest framework statutes, stating the principle that an appropriation may be spent only
on the "objects" designated in the appropriation. See supra text accompanying note 51.
276. These efforts are explored in Stith, supra note 61, and L. WILMERDING, supra note 4.
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